

Inequality and Redistribution Behavior in a Give-or-Take Game

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May 2017

ABSTRACT

Political polarization and extremism are widely thought to be driven by the surge in economic inequality in many countries around the world. However, this diagnosis depends on knowing the causal effect of inequality on individual behavior. We study how inequality affects redistribution behavior in a randomized “give-or-take” experiment that created equality, advantageous inequality, or disadvantageous inequality between two individuals before offering one of them the opportunity to either take from or give to the other. We estimate the causal effect of inequality in representative samples of German and American citizens (N=4,966) and find that individuals imperfectly equalize payoffs: On average, respondents transfer 12% of the available endowments to realize more equal wealth distributions. Thus, citizens tolerate a considerable degree of inequality even in a setting in which its removal would be feasible at zero costs. Moreover, individuals that take from those that are richer are not the same individuals that tend to give to those that are poorer. These behavioral redistribution types correlate in meaningful ways with support for heavy taxes on the rich and the provision of welfare benefits for the poor. Consequently, it seems difficult to construct a majority coalition willing to back the type of government interventions needed to counter rising inequality.

Humans have always engaged in some degree of wealth redistribution to realize more equitable outcomes (Adams 2005; Hirth 1978; Pennisi 2014). This is consistent with an extensive body of research based on laboratory experiments documenting that individuals prefer relatively more equal distributions to unequal ones (Henrich et al. 2001; Camerer and Fehr 2004; Dawes et al. 2007). Yet, the massive rise in within-country inequality over the past decades has by far surpassed increases in redistribution efforts (Piketty and Saez 2014; Scheve and Stasavage 2016; Wright 2017). This seems surprising since democracies allow citizens to vote for more redistribution (Romer 1975; Meltzer and Richard 1981). We propose an explanation that can reconcile these two facts by highlighting that understanding the absence of large-scale redistribution requires knowledge about the causal impact of favorable and unfavorable distributions of wealth (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) on the willingness of individuals to engage in redistribution.

We designed a randomized inequality experiment to study the drivers of redistribution by measuring responses to exogenous changes in inequality as revealed by human re-allocation behavior in representative samples of the adult population (see Supporting Information for detailed descriptions of methods, sample, and further results). Our instrument combined a “give-or-take” game with a randomized experiment that exogenously varied the level of inequality between two individuals by raffling two Amazon gift cards among all respondents. The two gift cards could take on three values, each corresponding to a different type of inequality. In the “own poorer” condition the values were \$/€25 (own) and \$/€75 (other). In the “own richer” condition the value of the gift cards was reversed (\$/€75, \$/€25). In the “equality” condition the gift cards were worth \$/€50 each. Respondents were then given the option to give to or take from the other winner or to do nothing. Individuals that decided to give or take saw a slider that allowed them to give any amount up to all of the initial endowment to the other winner (if they chose give) or take any amount from the initial endowment of the other winner (if they chose take). A purely self-interested individual would maximize his or her monetary payoff by taking all of the other winner’s endowment under all three treatment conditions. We embedded this experiment in surveys conducted of representative samples of the adult population in the United States

(N=2,749) and Germany (N=2,217). The SI provides detailed information about institutional approval and the informed consent procedure as well as the samples and survey.

This design offers several advantages that help to improve over previous studies. The randomization of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality ensures that any differences in individuals' allocation choices can be causally attributed to exogenous differences in the initial values of their gift cards. Previous work has primarily relied on observational data for which it is difficult to sustain a causal interpretation of observed correlations between inequality and redistribution (Perotti 1996; Milanovic 2000; Kelly and Enns 2010; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller 2016; Wright 2017). Experimental work has also almost exclusively analyzed giving behavior in dictator games in which there existed only one type of extreme inequality in which the dictator had everything while the other person had nothing (Cappelen et al. 2013; List 2007; Eckel, Grossman and Johnston 2005) and the dictator could only give to, but not take from the other individual Thomsson and Vostroknutov (2017); Engel (2011). An important recent study (Agranov and Palfrey 2015) has begun to vary the level of inequality while maintaining several of the features that characterize previous experimental work such as the focus on laboratory behavior of students (Zhang et al. 2014), the existence of only one type of (favorable) inequality, and allowing individuals to only give to but not take from one another. By studying representative samples of the American and German adult population, we can characterize the composition of these societies in terms of human responses to different types of inequality. The use of representative samples is advisable since redistribution behavior among students and other selected subgroups may not necessarily generalize to the voting-eligible population Bechtel and Scheve (2017). Finally, we develop a within-subjects design to elicit and classify individuals based on their conditional redistribution schedules, i.e., their responses to variation in the type (advantageous vs. disadvantageous) and level of inequality. Although this information seems important to explain attitudes toward redistribution among the rich and the poor (Cavaillé and Trump 2015; Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve 2017), it has not been collected in existing work on the topic (Tammi 2013; Cappelen et al. 2013).

THE CAUSAL EFFECTS OF INEQUALITY ON REDISTRIBUTION BEHAVIOR

Fig. 1 displays the causal effects of favorable (advantageous) and unfavorable (disadvantageous) inequality on redistribution behavior as observed in the give-or-take experiment. By comparing the average amount of money redistributed in each condition, we can measure the effect of advantageous inequality (“own richer”) and disadvantageous inequality (“own poorer”) on human redistribution behavior. We find that a-inequality (“own richer”) generates a significant level of giving among respondents: On average, richer individuals give $\$/\text{€}9$ (12% of their own endowment) to the poorer respondent. Under conditions of equality, the amount re-allocated is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, d-inequality causes significant taking-behavior as individuals who are poorer take $\$/\text{€}10$ (13% of the other’s endowment) from the other respondent (see also Tables S3 and S4). There exist little differences in how Germans and Americans re-allocate endowments in response to unequal initial distributions. These results suggest that inequality creates demand for the re-allocation of wealth, but the extent of redistribution does not fully remove inequality. This latter finding is consistent with recent experimental results suggesting that even if inequality reflects brute luck, individuals incompletely equalize payoffs (Weinzierl 2017).

We believe that the absence of large-scale policy interventions to reduce increasing inequality reflects that only some individuals are willing to engage in re-allocation behavior that equalizes payoffs whereas others fall short of equalizing.

ESTIMATING INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL AVERSION TO INEQUALITY

To explore behavioral differences in responding to inequality we asked respondents how much they would give or take conditional on different values of the other winner’s initial gift card value ($\$/\text{€}5$, $\$/\text{€}15$, $\$/\text{€}25$, $\$/\text{€}50$, $\$/\text{€}75$, $\$/\text{€}85$, $\$/\text{€}95$) while keeping the initial value of the respondent’s gift card, which was randomly assigned to be either ($\$/\text{€}25$, $\$/\text{€}50$, or $\$/\text{€}75$), constant. This provides us with 4,966 individual redistribution schedules that say how much and in which direction each individual would redistribute given a specific distribution of wealth,




Figure 1: Advantageous (a-)inequality (“own richer”), equality, and disadvantageous (d-)inequality (“own poorer”) cause different types of redistribution behavior as measured by the \$/€ taken/given in the (A) pooled data, the (B) United States and (C) Germany. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals calculated from robust standard errors. All differences are statistically significant ($p < .001$). $N(\text{total})=4,966$. $N(\text{United States})=2,749$, $N(\text{Germany})=2,217$.

which here is understood as differences in the value of the two Amazon gift cards. Figure S4 shows the frequency of individual redistribution schedules.

To obtain individual-level estimates of how respondents’ redistribution behavior depends on the type and level of inequality we regress the redistributed amount on the difference in the Amazon gift cards separately for scenarios in which an individual was richer than the other (advantageous or a-inequality aversion) and scenarios in which an individual was poorer than the other (disadvantageous or d-inequality aversion). The Materials and Methods provide details on this estimation procedure. The estimated coefficient provides us with a measure of the extent to which an individual gives or takes as a function of differences in wealth. In principle, directly interpreting this elasticity also requires taking into account the constant (the redistribution under

conditions of equality). However, as the causal evidence reported in Fig. 1 suggests, individuals tend to redistribute an amount close to zero in response to perfect equality. Moreover, we inspect the distribution of the constant estimated in the auxiliary individual-level regressions. We find that the median value is 0 for both aversion to advantageous and aversion to disadvantageous inequality. Therefore, we abstract away from the constant and focus on the estimated aversion parameter to examine differences in how individuals react to inequality.

Fig. 2 shows the distributions of individual-level aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. Parameter values of 0 and .5 have a straightforward theoretical interpretation: A value of 0 means that an individual is on average unresponsive to changes in inequality as measured by differences in the gift card values. In contrast, a value of .5 indicates that an individual tends to engage in redistribution that equalizes payoffs by either giving or taking 50% of the difference in the values of the two gift cards. The two most frequent values in both distributions is 0 and .5. This indicates that a plurality of individuals either accept inequality without engaging in any redistribution or tend to perfectly equalize payoffs.

Do individuals who are averse to favorable inequality also exhibit aversion to disadvantageous inequality? The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference between the two distributions of individual-level inequality aversion ($p < .00$) and the correlation between the inequality aversion parameters is quite weak ($r = -.17, p < .00$).

When breaking down the distributions of the raw inequality aversion parameters by country we find that 22% tend to perfectly equalize in Germany when confronted with unfavorable inequality while only about 15% of Americans remove this type of inequality. Instead, the modal value in the United States is 0 with 20% of respondents in the US leaving the given level of unfavorable inequality unchanged. In contrast, only 12% of Germans are unresponsive to disadvantageous inequality. The stronger tendency of Germans to redistribute proportionally more in response to higher inequality also applies to conditions of advantageous inequality. 22% perfectly remove favorable inequality in Germany, while only 17% eliminate the wealth differences in the give-or-take game in the United States. Instead, among our American respondents the




Figure 2: The distributions of individual aversion to a-inequality (white bars) and d-inequality (grey bars) in the give-or-take game differ in the pooled data (A) and the distribution of disadvantageous (B) and advantageous (C) inequality aversion are also different in Germany and the United States. The aversion parameters are estimated in a linear regression of the amount taken/given on the difference between individuals' gift card values in the give-or-take game using respondents' conditional redistribution schedules (Figure S4). See text and Materials and Methods in the SI for details on the underlying estimation procedure. $N(\text{Pooled}) = 4,796$, $N(\text{United States})=2,645$ (d-inequality), 2,735 (a-inequality), $N(\text{Germany})=2,170$ (d-inequality), 2,208 (a-inequality)

most common response (20%) to the other individual being poorer is to leave the distribution of wealth as measured by the gift card values unchanged. In Germany, only 12% are unresponsive to this type of inequality.

The empirical clustering at and around the theoretically meaningful values of 0 (unresponsive) and .5 (perfectly equalize) suggests a coding scheme that distinguishes between three redistribution types: equalizers tend to re-allocate an amount that roughly leads to an equal distribution of wealth as measured by the final values of the two Amazon gift cards, i.e., on average, humans classified as equalizers have an elasticity of 0.5. Non-Equalizers do not or only very mildly redistribute wealth. On average, their sensitivity to inequality is estimated at 0. These two groups comprise the vast majority of individuals (over 70%). We also form a residual category of Other that also tend to redistribute, but their behavior does not seem to be driven by the motivation to equalize payoffs. Instead, this group comprises individuals that either take too much or give too much to equalize payoffs. Therefore, this group consists of strongly altruistic and strongly egoistic individuals whose behavior results in higher levels of post-redistribution inequality in the give-or-take game.

Table 1 shows the joint distribution of redistribution types in our representative samples using the classification above for the pooled data and separately by country. We find that 47% of the voting-eligible population can be classified as tending to equalize inequality in response to disadvantageous inequality and the same proportion equalizes when confronted with advantageous inequality. This suggests that the public is divided over how to respond to inequality in ways that make it difficult to build a majority coalition that would be willing to back large-scale redistribution to counter rising inequality. However, this conclusion is misleading since only about 30% of all citizens are averse to both disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. This hints at an important explanation for the absence of political redistribution: The group of citizens that would favor the type of policy interventions leading to lower inequality could be quite small. If we break down our results by country, we find that 38% of all respondents in Germany are averse to both types of inequality whereas in the United States, only 25% tend to equalize favorable

Table 1: Frequencies of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample and by Country (Weighted).

Pooled Data				
D-Redistribution Type	A-Redistribution Type			Total
	Equalizer	Non-equalizer	Other	
Equalizer	30	14	3	47
Non-equalizer	10	17	2	29
Other	7	9	8	24
Total	47	39	13	

By Country				
D-Redistribution Type	A-Redistribution Type			Total
	Germany, United States			
	Equalizer	Non-equalizer	Other	
Equalizer	38, 25	15, 13	4, 3	56, 40
Non-equalizer	9, 11	12, 21	2, 3	23, 35
Other	7, 7	8, 9	7, 9	22, 25
Total	54, 43	35, 43	12, 14	

Note: Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions in which we model the amount given as a function of the differences in respondents' initial gift card values. See Materials and Methods in the SI for estimation details. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. $N = 4,966$.

and unfavorable differences in wealth. These results remain very similar when using an alternative classification scheme that varies the cutoff values (see Materials and Methods in the SI and Tables S21-S28.)

INDIVIDUAL REDISTRIBUTION TYPES AND PUBLIC POLICY

To what extent can the patterns in our experimental data explain citizens' attitudes toward government redistribution and macro-level differences in actual redistribution between the United States and Germany? To address these questions we first analyze whether our redistribution types classification, which relies on human behavior as displayed in a highly simplified, two-member society, correlates in theoretically consistent ways with citizens' opinions on policy instruments that aim at reducing inequality. We focus on two important types of policy instruments: imposing heavy taxes on the rich and the provision of welfare benefits, each of which constitutes a response

to unfavorable and favorable inequality, respectively.

Figure 3A shows results from a linear regression of individuals' policy views as measured on a five-point agree-disagree scale on redistribution type using Non-Equalizers as the reference group (see also Tables S13-S20). As one would expect, d-Equalizers are significantly more likely to support heavy taxes on the rich than Non-Equalizers. In contrast, there exists no statistically discernible difference between those two groups when investigating support for upholding current levels of welfare spending. This correlational pattern adds to the validity of our distinction between d-inequality and a-inequality: Since the behavior we observe under conditions of disadvantageous inequality captures aversion to others being richer, d-Equalizers should support policies that aim to reduce the wealth concentration among the rich, but not necessarily advocate the provision of benefits meant to make the poorest better off. Consistent with this reasoning, Figure 3B reveals that our classification of redistribution behavior in response to a-inequality predicts support for avoiding welfare spending cuts. Again, as one would expect, a-Equalizers and a-Non-Equalizers do not differ significantly on their support for high taxes on the rich. Overall, these patterns suggest that distinguishing between a-inequality and d-inequality improves our ability to explain differences in support for government redistribution. Additional results from a validation study in which we randomized whether respondents played the give-or-take game before answering the policy questions or vice versa suggest that the question order did not change the causal effects of inequality on individuals' redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game (Table S33). Thus, the correlation between redistribution type and policy views is unlikely to be due to consistency-seeking behavior.

Finally, we explore whether the difference in the frequency of redistribution types between Germany and the United States is consistent with the observable degree of electoral support for political redistribution and the actual level of government redistribution in those two countries. Theoretically, since the share of individuals that are both a- and d-equalizers is considerably smaller in the United States than in Germany, we would expect less electoral support for redistribution in the United States than in Germany. Also, if the unequal distribution of citizens




Figure 3: Redistribution type predicts variation in policy views. Shown are marginal effects of (A) d-equalizer and (B) a-equalizer redistribution types on policy views compared to non-equalizers in the pooled data, United States, and Germany. We use a linear regression to model policy views as a function of redistribution type (using binary indicator variables) and a full set of socio-demographic and political covariates as well as country-fixed effects (Tables S13-S17 report the underlying estimates in detail). Policy Views are measured on a five-point scale (strongly disagree – strongly agree). Dots with vertical lines indicate point estimates with robust 95% confidence intervals. $N(\text{total}) = 4,921$, $N(\text{United States}) = 2,733$, $N(\text{Germany}) = 2,188$.

that are both a- and d-equalizers is politically relevant, we should observe more redistribution in Germany than in the United States. To account for differences in parties' policy platforms we compare the major party's vote share-weighted welfare policy positions. This measure is the product of each party's welfare policy position (Volkens et al. 2017) and its level of electoral support. The results are reported in Table S34. We find that both SPD and CDU tend to score considerably higher on this welfare state support measure than the Democratic party and the Republican party in the United States, respectively. This pattern is consistent with our experimental finding in that political redistribution in response to favorable inequality is higher in Germany than in the United States. To assess the extent of actual government redistribution

observable in Germany and the United States, we compare two important measures of actual redistribution: The reduction in poverty as a function of taxes and transfers and the reduction in income inequality due to taxes and transfers (Table S35). We find that on both measures, Germany redistributes considerably more. Through taxes and transfers it reduces the poverty rate by 20 percentage points whereas the United States reduces the poverty rate by merely 8 percentage points, although the before tax levels of poverty are quite similar (.32 in the US and .36 in Germany). Similarly, we find that Germany reduces income inequality much more strongly than the United States. These patterns appear consistent with the composition of the two countries in terms of how individuals respond to favorable and unfavorable inequality in our experiment. The joint distribution of a- and d-equalizers may therefore improve our ability to explain both political support for and the actual level of government redistribution.

DISCUSSION

This study provides causal estimates of how inequality affects redistribution behavior, proposes a method to classify individual redistribution types, and shows that this classification predicts attitudes towards redistributive policies. We believe future work could investigate the potential consequences of relaxing several assumptions of our study since the give-or-take experiment and the setting in which it was embedded strongly simplified the decision-making process that leads to government redistribution in democracies. First, our setting created “mini”-societies in which re-allocation was costless. In the real world, redistribution requires bureaucratic effort and these costs reduce the resources available for re-allocation Durante, Putterman and van der Weele (2014). Second, we did not specify the process that generated the initial distribution of wealth. Arguably, if individuals believe that inequality reflects differences in effort as opposed to luck or privilege, this should affect their willingness to redistribute (Scheve and Stasavage 2016; Durante, Putterman and van der Weele 2014; Fisman et al. 2015; Brosnan and de Waal 2003). Third, our experiment left the social identity of the other winner to whom the individual could give to or take from unspecified. To the extent that individuals treat in-group and out-group

members differently, we might expect variation in redistributive behavior conditional on social heterogeneity (Huber and Ting 2017; Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2001; Gilens 1999). Fourth, we deliberately removed strategic considerations by allowing only one individual to change the distribution of wealth. Plausibly, expectations about how others will respond to higher tax burdens or more generous social benefits can influence how strongly individuals would like to redistribute (Durante, Putterman and van der Weele 2014; Fisman et al. 2015; Foellmi and Oechslin 2008).

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Supporting Information Appendix

Inequality and Redistribution Behavior in a Give-or-Take Game

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Materials and Methods
Figs. S1 to S3
Tables S1 to S72

Materials and Methods

IRB Approval and Informed Consent

The study was approved by the Internal Review Board at [redacted for review process: Washington University in St. Louis (IRB ID # 201607129)] after a full review that also included a cultural review. The IRB at [redacted for review process Stanford University] reviewed the research protocol and determined that the study qualifies for exempt review [redacted for review process (eProtocol # 38517)].

The informed consent text which respondents saw on the first page of the online survey before indicating whether they would like to participate or not read as follows:

“We invite you to participate in a research study being conducted by investigators from [redacted for review process: Washington University in St. Louis, Stanford University and the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland]. The purpose of the study is to examine people’s thoughts about contemporary political and economic issues.

If you agree to participate, we would like you to complete a short survey about your public policy views. The survey should take no longer than 15 minutes. Approximately 15,000 people will take part in this study. There are no known risks from being in this study, and you will not benefit personally. However we hope that others may benefit in the future from what we learn as a result of this study. You will not have any costs for being in this research study.

All participants who complete the survey will receive Mingle points per Respondi’s policies and will be automatically entered into five prize drawings for an Amazon gift card of \$100. The winners will be informed by Respondi.

Your responses will be anonymous - you will not be individually identified and your responses will be used for statistical purposes only. Washington University will only receive de-identified survey responses with no information about you. However, federal regulatory agencies and [redacted for review process: Washington University, including the Washington University Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research studies) and the Human Research Protection Office] may inspect and copy records pertaining to this research. If we write a report about this study we will do so in such a way that you cannot be identified.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. Any data that was collected as part of this study will remain as part of the study records and cannot be removed. If you decide to participate in the study you may stop participating at any time by closing out of your browser. You will not be penalized or lose any benefits for which you otherwise qualify.

We encourage you to ask questions. If you have any questions about or feel harmed from being in the study, please contact: [redacted for review process Michael Bechtel at michael.bechtel@unisg.ch. If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a

research participant, please contact the Human Research Protection Office at 660 South Euclid Avenue, Campus Box 8089, St. Louis, MO 63110, 1-(800)-438-0445 or email hrpo@wustl.edu. General information about being a research participant can be found on the Human Research Protection Office web site, <http://hrpo.wustl.edu>]. To offer input about your experiences as a research participant or to speak to someone other than the research staff, call [redacted for review process the Human Research Protection Office] at the number above.”

Survey Programming and Sample

We programmed and hosted the survey in Qualtrics. The online sample was provided by Respondi. Respondi maintains own, actively managed online-panels that employ a combination of online and offline recruitment methods to ensure that the panels can be used for conducting representative surveys (1). We provided Respondi with margins for socio-demographics (age, gender, education) derived from population censuses to ensure that our samples match the population margins in the United States and Germany. To remove any remaining imbalances we weighted the data using the ebalance-algorithm (2). Table S1 provides information about the distribution of socio-demographic characteristics in the raw sample, the weighted sample, and the voter population. Unless indicated otherwise, all analyses use weighted data.

Give-or-Take Game and Redistribution Behavior in the Strategy Method

The survey contained two parts to elicit individuals' aversion to advantageous (a) and disadvantageous (d) inequality. The first part was the payoff-relevant “give or take” game which was explicitly payoff-relevant. We provided respondents with the game instructions (see Figure S1 for an example). The game was based on the option of winning one of two Amazon gift cards. The initial values of these gift cards could vary. We informed respondents about the initial value of their gift card that he/she could win and the other winner's gift card. We randomized these initial values (\$ in the United States and € in Germany) to be (respondent/other winner): (25/75), (50/50), or (75/25) and informed respondents that they could increase or decrease these values by choosing to give to or take from the other winner. If a respondent chose to give, the amount would be deducted from his/her initial gift card value and added to the other winner's gift card. If a respondent decided to take, the amount would be deducted from the other winner's gift card and added to his/her own gift card. We illustrated these two options with an example. The experiment randomized the order in which the two options were displayed.

On the screen that followed, respondents were again shown the initial gift card values and asked whether they wanted to give, take or do nothing (see Figure S2). We randomized the order of the answer options “give” and “take”. Respondents could use a slider to give any amount up to all of their entire initial endowment to the other winner (if they decided to give) or take any amount up to the entire initial endowment of the other winner (if they decided to take). Respondents were shown in real time the final values of both gift cards depending on the current slider position (see Figure S3). Individuals could redistribute any amount as long as the resulting value of the two vouchers was zero or positive.

The second part relied on the strategy method to elicit respondents' redistribution schedules. We did not inform respondents that this part of the survey was no longer payoff-relevant. The exact question wording for the first question was:

“Now, suppose that the initial value of your gift card was the same but the initial value of the other winner’s gift card was different. Please indicate how much you would like to either take from or give to the other winner if the initial value of the gift cards is as follows:

You: \$75
Other: \$5”

We repeated this question (using a slightly shorter version) with the initial value of the respondent’s gift card remaining constant while the other winner’s initial gift card took on each of the following initial values: 15, 25, 50, 75, 85, and 95 \$/€. Respondents were not asked again how much they would redistribute if the other winner’s initial gift card value was equal to the initial value in the first part of the give-or-take game. Below each question was a slider that ranged from the maximum amount a respondent could take to the maximum amount a person could give. The resulting final values of the gift cards were shown in real time depending on the slider position. This provides us with a redistribution schedule for each respondent that says how much a person redistributes conditional on the direction and level of inequality.

Coding of Types

We estimate each respondent’s sensitivity to a- and d-inequality using their conditional redistribution behavior in combination with individual-level auxiliary regressions. The dependent variable is *Given* which measures the amount given (positive values) or taken in each of the proposed scenarios. Our independent variables are: ΔPoorer , which is the difference between the other respondent’s initial gift card value and the respondent’s own initial gift card value. The second independent variable is ΔRicher . This variable equals the difference between one’s own initial gift card value and the gift card value of other respondent.

To derive individual-level sensitivities to a- and d-inequality, we estimate two auxiliary regressions for each respondent. To estimate d-sensitivity (the elasticity of redistribution behavior to disadvantageous inequality) we regress for each respondent the amount given on ΔPoorer using all observations for which $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ and multiply the estimated coefficient by -1. To estimate a-sensitivity (the elasticity of redistribution behavior to advantageous inequality), we regress for each respondent the amount given on ΔRicher using all observations for which $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$.

We use the estimated coefficients (d-sensitivity and a-sensitivity) to classify individuals’ redistribution types. We use the following coding rule where “sensitivity” refers to the estimated coefficient:

- Equalizer: $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$
- Non-Equalizer: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$
- Other: All remaining cases.

Robustness of Classification

To assess the sensitivity of our results to these coding rules, we develop an alternative coding scheme that changes the intervals that identify Equalizers and Non-Equalizers:

- Equalizer_{Alt}: $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$
- Non-Equalizer_{Alt}: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$
- Other_{Alt}: All remaining cases.

Fig. S1.

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Instructions. This picture shows the screen that respondents saw as introduction text to the give-or-take game. In the example, the initial value of the respondent's gift card is \$75 and that of the other person \$25. The experiment randomized the order in which the options "Give" and "Take" were displayed and the amount given/taken in the examples was always \$15.

We will raffle two Amazon gift cards among all respondents that have completed the survey. Just like people's wealth in the real world, the values of these gift cards may vary.

Suppose you are one of the winners and the initial value of your gift card is \$75 and the initial value of the other winner's gift card is \$25. You will have the possibility to increase or decrease the value of both gift cards:

Option "Give": You can give any amount from your gift card to the other winner. Any amount given to the other will be deducted from your gift card and then added to the gift card of the other winner.

- For example, if you decide to give \$15, you will receive \$60, and the other person will receive \$40.

Option "Take": You can take any amount from the other winner's gift card to increase the value of your gift card. Any amount taken from the other will be deducted from the gift card of the other winner and added to your gift card.

- For example, if you decide to take \$15, you will receive \$90, and the other person will receive \$10.

Fig. S2.

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Decision Whether to Take or Give. This picture shows the screen that respondents saw when they were asked whether they wanted to take, give, or do nothing. In the example, the initial value of the respondent's gift card is \$75 and that of the other person \$25. The experiment randomized the order in which the options "Take" and "Give" were displayed but always showed "Do nothing" as last option.

The initial value of your gift card is: \$75

The initial value of the other person's gift card is: \$25

Do you want to take something from the other person, give something to the other person, or do nothing?

- Take
- Give
- Do nothing

Fig. S3

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Giving in the \$75/\$25-Condition. The picture shows the screen respondents saw that chose to give in the 75\$ own/25\$ other condition. Respondents could use the slider to indicate the amount they wanted to give to the other person. The final values of the gift cards were updated in real time as a function of the slider position and were displayed to respondents below the slider. The range of the slider in the experiment varied and was chosen so that each respondent could take or give (depending on the choice made in the question displayed in Figure S2) the maximum amount possible depending on the initial values of the gift cards. The custom start position of the slider was set to 0 and individuals that chose to do nothing in the previous screen skipped this part.

The initial value of your gift card is: \$75
The initial value of the other person's gift card is: \$25

How much do you want to give?

(Please note that even if you do not want to move the slider, you have to touch it to proceed to the next question.)



The final value of your gift card is: \$56

The final value of the other person's gift card is: \$44

Fig. S4

Distribution of Individuals' Redistribution Schedules in the Give-or-Take Game. The plot shows the share taken/given conditional on the type and level of inequality between the two players in the give-or-take game by level of respondents' own initial endowments. The share taken is the amount taken divided by the other respondent's endowment, which is the maximum possible amount that could be taken. The share given is the amount given divided by the respondent's own initial endowment which is the maximum possible amount that could be given to the other. Darker lines indicate higher frequency. The redistribution schedules are elicited using the strategy method (see Materials and Methods for details).




Table S1.

Distributions of Socio-demographics in the Survey Sample and the Population. The table shows the distributions of socio-demographics in the population, the weighted sample, and the raw sample. The population socio-demographics are taken from the following sources: United States: 2016 Current Population Survey. Germany: German Statistical Office, 2011 Population Census and data on education was obtained from the German statistical office for the year 2010.

	Population (%)	Weighted Sample (%)	Raw Sample (%)
United States (N=2,749)			
Age: 18-24	12.30%	12.34%	14.26%
Age: 25-44	32.50%	32.54%	34.99%
Age: 45-64	34.70%	34.67%	33.32%
Age: 65+	20.50%	20.45%	17.43%
Gender: Male	48.20%	48.22%	48.96%
Gender: Female	51.80%	51.78%	51.04%
Education: Less than high school degree	9.50%	9.46%	6.88%
Education: High school degree	29.20%	29.26%	32.96%
Education: Some college	30.00%	30.08%	34.78%
Education: Bachelor's degree	20.00%	19.92%	14.44%
Education: Advanced degree	11.20%	11.28%	10.94%
Germany (N=2,217)			
Age: 18-24	8.60%	8.59%	7.67%
Age: 25-44	27.50%	27.51%	29.27%
Age: 45-64	37.00%	37.00%	36.18%
Age: 65+	26.90%	26.90%	26.88%
Gender: Male	48.40%	48.43%	51.20%
Gender: Female	51.60%	51.57%	48.80%
Education: High school lowest tier	43.80%	43.62%	28.06%
Education: High school medium tier	25.70%	25.98%	44.79%
Education: High school high tier	14.50%	14.45%	12.00%
Education: University/College	16.10%	15.95%	15.15%

Table S2.

Measurement and Coding of Variables. This table describes the variables and variable codings.

<i>Amount Taken</i>	Amount taken in the give-or-take game (in \$/€) explained in the Section “Materials and Methods”. Amounts taken are positive, amounts given negative.
<i>Government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.</i>	Based on the question “To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements:” The exact wording of the item was “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.” We measured respondents’ attitudes towards this statement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We randomized the polarity of the answer scale and adapted the initial part of the question text accordingly.
<i>Government should not spend less on benefits for the poor.</i>	Based on the question “To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements:” The exact wording of the item was “The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.” We measured respondents’ attitudes towards this statement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and recoded the answers to invert the item and the answer scale. We randomized the polarity of the answer scale and adapted the initial part of the question text accordingly.
<i>Male</i>	Self-reported gender. Recoded into binary variable where 1 equals male and 0 female.
<i>Age</i>	Self-reported age. Recoded into the categories 18-29, 30-49, 50-69, and 70+.
<i>Income</i>	Self-reported household income. Recoded into income: low (income in the lowest quartile), income: middle (interquartile range), and income: high (income in the upper quartile) with unweighted data.
<i>Education</i>	Self reported highest level of education achieved. US respondents were coded into the following categories: low: up to and including high school degree or equivalent, middle: Some college (1-4 years, no degree) and associate’s degree (including occupational degree), high: Bachelor’s degree and advanced degrees. German respondents were coded into the following categories: low: up to and including secondary school leaving certificate (Haupt-(Volks-)schulabschluss), middle: polytechnic secondary school of the former GDR (Abschluss polytechnische Oberschule der DDR), intermediate secondary school or similar degree (Realschul- oder gleichwertiger Abschluss), university of applied sciences entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife), higher education entrance qualification (Abitur), and vocational education (Berufsausbildung), high: university of applied science degree (Fachhochschulabschluss) and university degree.
<i>Ideology</i>	Self-reported placement on left-right-scale (0-10). The question wording was: “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” Recoded into the categories left (0-2), center (3-7), and right (8-10).
<i>Employment status</i>	Self-reported employment status. The question wording was: “Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?” Answer categories included for the United States: “In paid work or away temporarily (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)”, “In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation”, “Unemployed and actively looking for a job”, “Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job”, “Permanently sick or disabled”, “Retired”, “In community service”, “In military service”, “Doing housework, looking after children or other persons”, “Don’t know”, and “None of these”. Answer categories for Germany: "Paid Work", "Doing Apprenticeship", "Unemployed and actively looking for job", "Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for job", "Mini- and Midi-Job", "Unemployed at the moment", "Short-time work at the moment", "Retired", "Housework", "Military, community service, voluntary social year", "In school". "Studying", "Not able to work", "Don't know", "No Answer" Recoded into employed, unemployed, retired, in education, and other.

Table S3.

The Causal Effect of Inequality: Amounts Taken in the Give-or-Take Game. This table reports linear regressions of amounts taken on the initial type of inequality for the pooled dataset (model 1), the United States (model 2), and Germany (model 3) using survey weights. Amounts taken are measured by individual's amount taken in the give-or-take game (positive: taken, negative: given). The initial type of inequality is coded as follows (respondent's initial gift card value in \$/€ / other's initial gift card value in \$/€): (25/75): Disadvantageous Inequality, (50/50): Equality, (75/25) Advantageous Inequality. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Pooled	(2) United States	(3) Germany
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality</i>	9.80*** (0.53)	9.79*** (0.74)	9.81*** (0.75)
<i>Equality</i>	0.80* (0.43)	1.27* (0.68)	0.22 (0.47)
<i>Advantageous Inequality</i>	-9.15*** (0.44)	-9.00*** (0.62)	-9.33*** (0.61)
<i>Observations</i>	4,966	2,749	2,217
<i>R-squared</i>	0.150	0.126	0.198

Table S4.

Amounts Taken in the Give-or-Take Game: Unweighted Results. This table reports linear regressions of amounts taken on the initial type of inequality for the pooled dataset (model 1), the United States (model 2), and Germany (model 3) without survey weights. Amounts taken are measured by individual's amount taken in the give-or-take game (positive: taken, negative: given). The initial type of inequality is coded as follows (respondent's initial gift card value in \$/€ / other's initial gift card value in \$/€): (25/75): Disadvantageous Inequality, (50/50): Equality, (75/25) Advantageous Inequality. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$).

	(1) Pooled	(2) United States	(3) Germany
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality</i>	9.95*** (0.52)	10.00*** (0.75)	9.90*** (0.69)
<i>Equality</i>	0.87** (0.42)	1.25* (0.67)	0.40 (0.48)
<i>Advantageous Inequality</i>	-9.22*** (0.43)	-9.08*** (0.62)	-9.41*** (0.57)
<i>Observations</i>	4,966	2,749	2,217
<i>R-squared</i>	0.152	0.128	0.198

Table S5.

Frequency of Redistribution Types. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column). Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. $N(\text{total})=4,966$. $N(\text{United States})=2,749$, $N(\text{Germany})=2,217$.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	46.93%	39.79%	55.79%
Non-Equalizer	29.43%	35.04%	22.47%
Other	23.63%	25.16%	21.74%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Types	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.48%	42.60%	53.54%
Non-Equalizer	39.23%	43.06%	34.48%
Other	13.29%	14.34%	11.98%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S6.

Frequency of Redistribution Types, Unweighted. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column). Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.08%	39.83%	56.07%
Non-Equalizer	29.42%	34.96%	22.55%
Other	23.50%	25.21%	21.38%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.58%	42.74%	53.59%
Non-Equalizer	39.05%	42.78%	34.42%
Other	13.37%	14.48%	12.00%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S7.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for the pooled dataset. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	30.38%	13.50%	3.06%	46.93%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	10.25%	16.93%	2.26%	29.43%
	<i>Other</i>	6.86%	8.81%	7.97%	23.63%
<i>Total</i>		47.48%	39.23%	13.29%	100.00%

Table S8.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for the pooled dataset. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	30.31%	13.49%	3.28%	47.08%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	10.33%	16.87%	2.22%	29.42%
	<i>Other</i>	6.95%	8.68%	7.87%	23.50%
<i>Total</i>		47.58%	39.05%	13.37%	100.00%

Table S9.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for the United States. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	24.55%	12.58%	2.67%	39.79%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	11.40%	21.10%	2.54%	35.04%
	<i>Other</i>	6.64%	9.38%	9.13%	25.16%
<i>Total</i>		42.60%	43.06%	14.34%	100.00%

Table S10.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for the United States. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	24.41%	12.59%	2.84%	39.83%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	11.53%	20.92%	2.51%	34.96%
	<i>Other</i>	6.80%	9.28%	9.13%	25.21%
<i>Total</i>		42.74%	42.78%	14.48%	100.00%

Table S11.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for Germany. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	37.60%	14.64%	3.55%	55.79%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	8.81%	11.75%	1.91%	22.47%
	<i>Other</i>	7.13%	8.09%	6.52%	21.74%
<i>Total</i>		53.54%	34.48%	11.98%	100.00%

Table S12.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for Germany. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	<i>Other</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer</i>	37.62%	14.61%	3.83%	56.07%
	<i>Non-Equalizer</i>	8.84%	11.86%	1.85%	22.55%
	<i>Other</i>	7.13%	7.94%	6.31%	21.38%
<i>Total</i>		53.59%	34.42%	12.00%	100.00%

Table S13.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.26*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
D-Other	0.36*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.02 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.10* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.06* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.26*** (0.09)	0.24*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)

Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)
In Education	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)
Ideology: Left	0.50*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.31*** (0.06)	-0.58*** (0.05)
Germany	0.58*** (0.04)	0.43*** (0.04)
Constant	3.28*** (0.08)	3.66*** (0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.131	0.164

Table S14.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.25*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
D-Other	0.34*** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.03 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.07 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Male	0.04 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.08 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.23*** (0.09)	0.25*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.04 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)
Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)

Ideology: Left	0.47*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.58*** (0.05)
Germany	0.59*** (0.04)	0.43*** (0.03)
Constant	3.29*** (0.07)	3.65*** (0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.123	0.163

Table S15.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results, Ideology Excluded. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (**p < .01, *p < .05, *p < .10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.26*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
D-Other	0.37*** (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.05 (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.08 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.02 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.03 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.06 (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.28*** (0.09)	0.21*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)
Employed	0.01 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.01	-0.06

	(0.08)	(0.08)
Retired	0.11*	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)
In Education	-0.17*	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Germany	0.63***	0.51***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	3.26***	3.57***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.101	0.115

Table S16.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Pooled Results, Ideology Excluded, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***p*<.01, ***p*<.05, **p*<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.26*** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
D-Other	0.35*** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.05)
A-Equalizer	0.05 (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)
A-Other	0.06 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Male	0.01 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.25*** (0.09)	0.23*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Retired	0.11* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.21** (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)

Germany	0.64*** (0.04)	0.52*** (0.03)
Constant	3.28*** (0.07)	3.57*** (0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.098	0.115

Table S17.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the United States and Germany (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, (**) $p < .05$, (*) $p < .10$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
	United States	Germany	United States	Germany
D-Equalizer	0.31*** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)
D-Other	0.46*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.18** (0.08)
A-Equalizer	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.06)
A-Other	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.15* (0.08)	0.01 (0.10)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Male	0.01 (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Income: Middle	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.31*** (0.08)	-0.39*** (0.07)	-0.17** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.10 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.29*** (0.09)
Age: 50-69	-0.14* (0.07)	0.16* (0.09)	0.16** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.09)
Age: 70+	-0.46*** (0.13)	0.16 (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)	0.41*** (0.12)
Education: Middle	-0.17*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.13** (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Employed	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.10 (0.10)
Unemployed	0.01	0.00	-0.12	0.08

	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Retired	0.08	0.11	-0.05	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)
In Education	-0.06	-0.20	-0.29**	0.17
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Ideology: Left	0.46***	0.51***	0.54***	0.27***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ideology: Right	-0.43***	0.04	-0.70***	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Constant	3.35***	3.77***	3.85***	3.72***
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.086	0.064	0.168	0.050

Table S18.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the United States and Germany (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, (**) $p < .05$, (*) $p < .10$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich United States	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich German	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor United States	Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor Germany
D-Equalizer	0.32*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
D-Other	0.46*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.16** (0.07)
A-Equalizer	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
A-Other	0.05 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.15*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)
Male	-0.01 (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)
Income: Middle	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.32*** (0.07)	-0.41*** (0.07)	-0.16** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.12* (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.27*** (0.08)
Age: 50-69	-0.13* (0.07)	0.21** (0.08)	0.17** (0.07)	0.37*** (0.08)
Age: 70+	-0.45*** (0.12)	0.20* (0.11)	0.16 (0.11)	0.44*** (0.11)
Education: Middle	-0.16*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.13** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Employed	0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.12 (0.09)
Unemployed	0.06 (0.09)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.08)	0.11 (0.13)
Retired	0.06 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)
In Education	-0.14	-0.21	-0.29**	0.22*

	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Ideology: Left	0.44***	0.47***	0.50***	0.31***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ideology: Right	-0.35***	0.01	-0.71***	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Constant	3.34***	3.82***	3.85***	3.70***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.077	0.061	0.168	0.053

Table S19.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results, Ideology Excluded. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the United States and Germany (with weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (***) $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
	United States	Germany	United States	Germany
D-Equalizer	0.34*** (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
D-Other	0.47*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.18** (0.08)
A-Equalizer	0.07 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.06)
A-Other	0.04 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.21*** (0.08)	0.00 (0.10)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Male	-0.04 (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Income: Middle	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.44*** (0.07)	-0.18** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.09 (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.30*** (0.08)
Age: 50-69	-0.15** (0.07)	0.17* (0.09)	0.16** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.09)
Age: 70+	-0.53*** (0.13)	0.19 (0.12)	0.06 (0.11)	0.44*** (0.12)
Education: Middle	-0.16*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Employed	0.05 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.28*** (0.06)	-0.09 (0.10)
Unemployed	0.03	0.02	-0.10	0.10

	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Retired	0.09	0.12	-0.05	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)
In Education	-0.03	-0.19	-0.23	0.20
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	3.33***	3.82***	3.77***	3.72***
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Observations	2,740	2,193	2,740	2,193
R-squared	0.049	0.036	0.085	0.041

Table S20.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types on Policy Views: Country Results Without Ideology, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1 and 2) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 3 and 4) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the United States and Germany (without weights). Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (** p<.01, * p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
	United States	Germany	United States	Germany
D-Equalizer	0.34*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
D-Other	0.47*** (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.15** (0.07)
A-Equalizer	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
A- Other	0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.15*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.11** (0.06)
Male	-0.04 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Income: Middle	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Income: High	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.47*** (0.07)	-0.16** (0.07)
Age: 30-49	0.10 (0.07)	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.29*** (0.08)
Age: 50-69	-0.15** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.16** (0.07)	0.39*** (0.08)
Age: 70+	-0.51*** (0.13)	0.23** (0.12)	0.07 (0.11)	0.46*** (0.11)
Education: Middle	-0.16*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Education: High	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
Employed	0.07 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.11 (0.09)
Unemployed	0.07 (0.09)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.13 (0.13)
Retired	0.07 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)
In Education	-0.12	-0.19	-0.24*	0.25**

	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Constant	3.33***	3.85***	3.76***	3.70***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Observations	2,740	2,193	2,740	2,193
R-squared	0.049	0.036	0.088	0.041

Table S21.

Frequency of Redistribution Types Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column) using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	51.28%	43.69%	60.7%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	26.47%	32.21%	19.35%
Other _{Alt}	22.24%	24.10%	19.94%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	53.00%	47.17%	60.22%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	34.14%	38.85%	28.31%
Other _{Alt}	12.86%	13.98%	11.47%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S22.

Frequency of Redistribution Types Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) separately for the pooled dataset (second column), the United States (third column), and Germany (fourth column) using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-0.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < 0.2$: Non-Equalizer, $0.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < 0.8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	51.57%	43.72%	61.30%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	26.44%	32.12%	19.40%
Other _{Alt}	21.99%	24.15%	19.31%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer _{Alt}	53.06%	47.29%	60.22%
Non-Equalizer _{Alt}	34.07%	38.70%	28.33%
Other _{Alt}	12.87%	14.01%	11.46%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S23.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for the pooled dataset using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	35.44%	12.47%	3.37%	51.28%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	9.91%	14.72%	1.85%	26.47%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.65%	6.96%	7.64%	22.24%
<i>Total</i>		53.00%	34.14%	12.86%	100.00%

Table S24.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for the pooled dataset using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	35.40%	12.59%	3.58%	51.57%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	10.03%	14.62%	1.79%	26.44%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.63%	6.87%	7.49%	21.99%
<i>Total</i>		53.06%	34.07%	12.87%	100.00%

Table S25.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for US respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	28.40%	12.23%	3.06%	43.69%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	11.10%	19.03%	2.08%	32.21%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.67%	7.60%	8.83%	24.10%
<i>Total</i>		47.17%	38.85%	13.98%	100.00%

Table S26.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for US respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	28.23%	12.26%	3.24%	43.72%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	11.28%	18.81%	2.04%	32.12%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.78%	7.64%	8.73%	24.15%
<i>Total</i>		47.29%	38.70%	14.01%	100.00%

Table S27.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany Using Alternative Coding Rules. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for German respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	44.18%	12.77%	3.76%	60.70%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	8.43%	9.37%	1.55%	19.35%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.61%	6.17%	6.16%	19.94%
<i>Total</i>		60.22%	28.31%	11.47%	100.00%

Table S28.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for German respondents using the alternative coding scheme. Types are classified based on the coefficients estimated in individual-level, auxiliary regressions that regress the amount given on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Poorer} \geq 0$ (for d-redistribution types) and the amount given on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where $\Delta\text{Richer} \geq 0$ (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 to facilitate comparisons and classification purposes. We use the following coding rules: $-.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .2$: Non-Equalizer, $.2 \leq \text{sensitivity} < .8$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		<i>A-Redistribution Type</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	
<i>D-Redistribution Type</i>	<i>Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	44.29%	12.99%	4.01%	61.30%
	<i>Non-Equalizer_{Alt}</i>	8.48%	9.43%	1.49%	19.40%
	<i>Other_{Alt}</i>	7.44%	5.91%	5.95%	19.31%
<i>Total</i>		60.22%	28.33%	11.46%	100.00%

Table S29.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules for Classifying Redistribution Types. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (with weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.37*** (0.06)	-0.10* (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.03 (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.14** (0.06)	-0.14** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)
Male	0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.26*** (0.09)	0.24*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Employed	0.01 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)
In Education	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)

Ideology: Left	0.50*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.32*** (0.06)	-0.59*** (0.05)
Germany	0.58*** (0.04)	0.43*** (0.04)
Constant	3.27*** (0.08)	3.67*** (0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.131	0.162

Table S30.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, socio-demographics, and ideology for the pooled dataset (without weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (**p < .01, *p < .05, *p < .10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.35*** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.03 (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.11* (0.06)	-0.15** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.04 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.08 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.23*** (0.09)	0.25*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.03 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)
Retired	0.10 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.23**	-0.12

	(0.09)	(0.08)
Ideology: Left	0.47***	0.40***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ideology: Right	-0.27***	-0.58***
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Germany	0.59***	0.43***
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	3.27***	3.66***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.123	0.163

Table S31.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules, Ideology Excluded. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (with weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.38*** (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.06 (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.12* (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)
Male	0.03 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.19*** (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.06 (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.04 (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)
Age: 70+	-0.28*** (0.09)	0.22*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)
Employed	0.01 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.01 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Retired	0.12* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)
In Education	-0.18* (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)

	(0.10)	(0.09)
Germany	0.64***	0.51***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	3.25***	3.57***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.101	0.118

Table S32.

Marginal Effects of Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results Using Alternative Coding Rules, Ideology excluded, Unweighted. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of the policy views “The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich” (model 1) and “The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor” (model 2) on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics for the pooled dataset (without weights) using the alternative coding scheme. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is “non-equalizer”. The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.26*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
D-Other _{Alt}	0.36*** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
A-Equalizer _{Alt}	0.05 (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)
A-Other _{Alt}	0.09 (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Male	0.01 (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Income: Middle	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)
Income: High	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.05)
Age: 30-49	0.07 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Age: 50-69	-0.02 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)
Age: 70+	-0.25*** (0.09)	0.23*** (0.08)
Education: Middle	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education: High	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)
Employed	0.02 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Unemployed	0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
Retired	0.11* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)
In Education	-0.21**	-0.07

	(0.09)	(0.09)
Germany	0.64***	0.51***
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	3.27***	3.57***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	4,933	4,933
R-squared	0.099	0.114

Table S33.

Comparison of the Causal Effects of Inequality in the Give-or-Take Game by Question Order in the Validation Study (Amazon Mechanical Turk Sample). This table reports coefficients from a linear regression of the amount taken on indicator variables for the inequality treatments and an indicator variable (*Policy Views First*) that equals 1 for all individuals that first had to answer the policy views questions and 0 for respondents that first played the give-or-take game as well as interactions between the inequality treatment conditions and the *Policy Views First* indicator variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	DV: Amount Taken
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality</i>	19.53*** (2.26)
<i>Equality</i>	10.13*** (2.27)
<i>Advantageous Inequality</i>	-3.86** (1.89)
<i>Policy Views First</i>	-4.54*
<i>Disadvantageous Inequality * Policy Views First</i>	(2.73) 3.22 (4.32)
<i>Equality * Policy Views First</i>	2.21 (4.12)
<i>Observations</i>	504
<i>R-squared</i>	0.284

Table S34.

Comparison of parties' vote-share weighted welfare policy ideal points in Germany and the United States, 2000-2013. Higher values indicate more support for welfare state expansion. Parties' welfare state position as reported in the Comparative Manifesto Project Database are weighted by the respective party's relative vote share in the corresponding election. For German parties the vote share is computed as the share of votes relative to the total votes for both the SPD and the CDU. For US parties, we use the parties' popular vote shares in presidential elections. SPD=Social Democratic Party, CDU=Christian Democratic Union. Data sources: https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/; https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/mp_v4; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_presidential_elections_by_popular_vote_margin; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2013; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2009; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2005; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_2002.

Year (GE/US)	SPD	Democrats	Difference		Difference	
			SPD-Democrats	CDU	Republicans	CDU-Republicans
2013/2012	857	576	281	422	264	158
2009/2008	731	357	374	353	169	184
2005/2004	605	457	148	408	251	157
2002/2000	513	685	-171	390	286	105
Mean	677	519	158	393	242	151

Table S35.

Comparison of redistribution in Germany and the United States (2014). This table reports changes in the poverty rate and income inequality due to taxes and transfers in Germany and the United States.

	United States	Germany	Difference (US-GE)
<i>Poverty rate (poverty line 60%)</i>			
Before taxes and transfers	.32	.36	.04
After taxes and transfers (poverty line 60%)	.24	.16	.08
Reduction (difference before and after)	-.08	-.20	-.16
<i>Income inequality Gini coefficient</i>			
Before taxes and transfers	.51	.50	.01
After taxes and transfers	.39	.29	.10
Reduction (difference before and after)	-.12	-.21	-.09

Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD), <http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm>.

References

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