Weekly Seminar: David Gill, “Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments” (Thursday, November 30th, 2017)

Will college students who set goals work harder and perform better?  We report the results of two field experiments that involved four thousand college students. One experiment asked treated students to set goals for performance in the course; the other asked treated students to set goals for a particular task. Task-based goals had large and robust positive effects on the level of task completion, and task-based goals also increased course performance. We also find that performance-based goals had positive but small effects on course performance. We use theory that builds on present bias and loss aversion to interpret our results.

Weekly Seminar: Piotr Evdokimov, “Delayed Review in Repeated Relationships” (Thursday, November 9th, 2017)

Piotr Evdokimov received his undergraduate degree at SUNY Binghamton in 2008 and his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Minnesota in 2014.  He is an assistant professor at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM).  His research interests include game theory and experimental economics.

Weekly Seminar: Devesh Rustagi, “Waiting for Napoleon? Democracy and Reciprocity Across Social Groups” (Thursday, November 2nd, 2017)

What explains large and persistent differences in reciprocity across social groups?  This paper exploits variation in historical experience of democracy over space and time in Switzerland to highlight its strong positive association with reciprocity today.  Individuals from regions that experienced democracy since the Middle Ages display stronger reciprocity than individuals from regions that acquired democracy only after the invasion by Napoleon.  Because historical democracy was widespread in Swiss German but limited in Swiss French-speaking regions, individuals from these groups differ widely in their reciprocity.  The difference, however, disappears when we compare Swiss Germans and Swiss French from regions without historical democracy.  These results are not capturing current institutions, beliefs, migration, historical dynasties, language and other group-specific characteristics.  Further results suggest that the emergence of historical democracy was due to idiosyncratic events and that its effect on reciprocity persists due to intergenerational transmission.

Weekly Seminar: Roman M. Sheremeta, “Why Are We So Competitive” (Thursday, October 12th, 2017)

Roman Sheremeta is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University and a research affiliate at the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Purdue University. The focus of his research is in experimental economics and game theory, with applications to behavioral economics, conflict resolution, industrial organization, public and labor economics.

The presentation will be loosely based on the paper “Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests.” https://ideas.repec.org/p/chu/wpaper/16-21.html

Weekly Seminar: Drew Fudenberg, “Predicting and Understanding Initial Play” (Thursday, October 5th, 2017)

Drew Fudenberg is the Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at MIT.  He received an A.B. in applied mathematics from Harvard College in 1978, and a Ph.D. in economics from MIT in 1981.  Fudenberg’s work on game theory ranges from foundational work on learning and equilibrium to the analysis of repeated games and reputation effects to the study of particular games, competition between firms, and other topics in theoretical industrial organization.  More recently he has worked on topics in behavioral economics and decision theory such as self-control and stochastic choice.

 

Weekly Seminar: Antonio Guarino, “Updating Ambiguous Beliefs in a Social Learning Experiment” (joint with Roberta De Filippis, Philippe Jehiel and Toru Kitagawa) (Thursday, April 27th, 2017)

Antonio Guarino is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at UCL.  He received his PhD in Economics from New York University.  His research interests cover financial economics (market microstructure), economic theory (social learning) and experimental economics.

Weekly Seminar: Muriel Niederle, “A Gender Agenda or From the Lab to the Field to Policy” (Thursday, April 20th, 2017)

Muriel Niederle is a Department of Economics Professor at Stanford University.  She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University.  She is a behavioral and experimental economist with a strong interest on gender differences in economic outcomes.  Niederle also has a line of work on market design.

Weekly Seminar: Collin Raymond, “Preferences for Non-Instrumental Information and Skewness” (Thursday, March 30th, 2017)

Collin Raymond’s research combines theory and experiments.  He primarily works on issues related to risk and information; especially how individuals seek out, and then use, certain types of information.  He earned his PhD from the University of Michigan in 2012.  He is currently an assistant professor at Amherst College, and will be starting as an assistant professor at Purdue in the autumn of 2017.

Spring 2017 Visiting Researcher: Peter Schwardmann

We would like to welcome Peter Schwardmann, who is visiting CESS from February to April 2017.  Peter’s research focuses on motivated cognition and topics in behavioral industrial organization.  He is particularly interested in why people hold biased beliefs and in how biased beliefs affect market outcomes.  Peter works at the University of Munich and received his Ph.D. from the Toulouse School of Economics in 2014.