Weekly Seminar: Antonio Guarino, “Updating Ambiguous Beliefs in a Social Learning Experiment” (joint with Roberta De Filippis, Philippe Jehiel and Toru Kitagawa) (Thursday, April 27th, 2017)

Antonio Guarino is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at UCL.  He received his PhD in Economics from New York University.  His research interests cover financial economics (market microstructure), economic theory (social learning) and experimental economics.

Weekly Seminar: Muriel Niederle, “A Gender Agenda or From the Lab to the Field to Policy” (Thursday, April 20th, 2017)

Muriel Niederle is a Department of Economics Professor at Stanford University.  She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University.  She is a behavioral and experimental economist with a strong interest on gender differences in economic outcomes.  Niederle also has a line of work on market design.

Weekly Seminar: Collin Raymond, “Preferences for Non-Instrumental Information and Skewness” (Thursday, March 30th, 2017)

Collin Raymond’s research combines theory and experiments.  He primarily works on issues related to risk and information; especially how individuals seek out, and then use, certain types of information.  He earned his PhD from the University of Michigan in 2012.  He is currently an assistant professor at Amherst College, and will be starting as an assistant professor at Purdue in the autumn of 2017.

Weekly Seminar: Theo Offerman, “Fight or Flight” (joint work with Boris van Leeuwen and Jeroen van de Ven) (December 15th, 2016)

theo-1 When two players compete for a prize, they sometimes try to act as quickly as possible.  At other times, they wait and see if the other person chooses to flee first.  We study this interaction in the context of a dynamic fight-or-flight game.  At each moment, a player can decide to wait, flee or fight.  Players are privately informed about their strengths, which in case of a battle determine who wins the prize.  In the case that one player flees and manages to escape, the other player earns the prize plus a “chase-away value”.  We show that the chase-away value determines if fights occur immediately or only after a waiting period.  In cases where the chase-away value is positive but not too large, players can use time to learn something about the type of the opponent, as the weaker players may find it advantageous to flee earlier in the game.  Weaker players thereby avoid the risk of ending up in a fight.  We derive conditions under which this is the case, and test this experimentally in the lab.  Our findings support the idea that endogenous timing can reduce the likelihood of a fight compared to a static version of the game (where players decide simultaneously whether to fight or flee).  We also observe many fights early on in the game, even if strong players would benefit from waiting.

Weekly Seminar: Emanuel Vespa, “Contingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory” (December 1st, 2016)

Emanuel Vespa is an experimental economist who studies behavior in economic environments using laboratory data. Most of his research is on dynamic games and on contingent thinking. Emanuel joined the faculty at the University of California Santa Barbara after earning his Ph.D. from New York University in 2012. He is currently visiting Stanford University for the academic year.

Weekly Seminar: Joshua Miller, “Surprised by the Gambler’s and Hot Hand Fallacies? A Truth in the Law of Small Numbers,” (joint with Adam Sanjurjo) November 17th, 2016


Joshua B. Miller’s research combines both theory and experiments.  He has written papers on blame, accountability, and the perception of social risk.  Recently he has been working on projects relating to probabilistic and causal beliefs, and how they are reflected in individual decision making, games, and markets.  Joshua earned his PhD from the University of Minnesota in 2009.  He is an assistant professor in the Department of Decision Sciences at Bocconi University in Milan, Italy.

Weekly Seminar: Attila Ambrus, “Experiments on Spatial Bargaining” (joint work with Ben Greiner) (November 3rd, 2016)

attila-ambrusAttila Ambrus is a Professor of Economics at Duke University, and a Research Economist at the NBER.  His research spans across topics in microeconomic theory, game theory, experimental economics, political economy and development economics, and include bargaining, strategic communication and delegation, group decision-making, coalition formation, and risk-sharing arrangements on social networks.  Dr. Ambrus serves as an associate editor of the Journal of Economic Theory, the International Journal of Game Theory, and the Review of Economic Design.  He received his Ph.D. in Economics at Princeton University, and his B.A. at the Budapest University of Economics.

Weekly Seminar – 7th May, 2015

Elizabeth Schotter
Elizabeth Schotter

On Thursday, 7th May, 2015, 12:30pm, Elizabeth Schotter, Postdoctoral Scholar in Psychology at UC San Diego, will present a talk on her paper “Eye Tracking Methods for the Behavioral Scientist.” Here’s an abstract.

Her research primarily focuses on the coordination of visual perception and cognitive processing when people read, speak or make decisions. The seminar will take place in NYU Economics Department, Room 517.

Weekly Seminar – 30th April, 2015

John Kagel
John Kagel

On Thursday, 30th April, 2015, 12:30pm, John Kagel, Professor at Ohio State University, will present a talk on his paper “Team vs Individual play in finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games.”

Professor Kagel’s research interests currently focus on group decision making and learning in strategic interactions between agents, auction design and performance, industrial organization issues, and legislative bargaining. He has won outstanding research awards at the University of Pittsburgh and Ohio State University.