Imperfect Competition and 64%-Majority Rule

My research in this area is all joint with Barry Nalebuff. The following three papers introduce a series of somewhat surprising technical results. In essence, we show that previously noted problems with voting systems and with models of price competition may be mitigated if individual differences are “not too great” in a sense that we make precise. The mean voter results offer the chance of progress in political models in which there is more than one dimension of difference. The imperfect competition results are used in applied research on differentiated product markets in industrial organization and in marketing.

On 64%-Majority Rule, with Barry Nalebuff, Econometrica, 1988, 787-814

Aggregation and Social Choice, with Barry Nalebuff, Econometrica, 1991, 1-23

Aggregation and Imperfect Competition, with Barry Nalebuff, Econometrica, 1991, 25-59

In the paper “Competition Among Institutions” , Barry and I developed a framework for analyzing competition among institutions, taking account of feedback effects whereby the inhabitants of a neighborhood influence outcomes, and outcomes influence preferences among neighborhoods. We were not able to make definitive progress: answers to these interesting questions appear to be beyond our grasp.