Roman Sheremeta is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University and a research affiliate at the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Purdue University. The focus of his research is in experimental economics and game theory, with applications to behavioral economics, conflict resolution, industrial organization, public and labor economics.
The presentation will be loosely based on the paper “Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests.” https://ideas.repec.org/p/chu/wpaper/16-21.html
Drew Fudenberg is the Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at MIT. He received an A.B. in applied mathematics from Harvard College in 1978, and a Ph.D. in economics from MIT in 1981. Fudenberg’s work on game theory ranges from foundational work on learning and equilibrium to the analysis of repeated games and reputation effects to the study of particular games, competition between firms, and other topics in theoretical industrial organization. More recently he has worked on topics in behavioral economics and decision theory such as self-control and stochastic choice.
Isabel Trevino is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at UC San Diego. She received her PhD in Economics from New York University. Her research is in the areas of microeconomic theory and experimental economics.
Antonio Guarino is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at UCL. He received his PhD in Economics from New York University. His research interests cover financial economics (market microstructure), economic theory (social learning) and experimental economics.
Muriel Niederle is a Department of Economics Professor at Stanford University. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. She is a behavioral and experimental economist with a strong interest on gender differences in economic outcomes. Niederle also has a line of work on market design.
We would like to welcome Peter Schwardmann, who is visiting CESS from February to April 2017. Peter’s research focuses on motivated cognition and topics in behavioral industrial organization. He is particularly interested in why people hold biased beliefs and in how biased beliefs affect market outcomes. Peter works at the University of Munich and received his Ph.D. from the Toulouse School of Economics in 2014.
Mark Dean is a behavioral economist who uses a combination of experimental methods and decision theory to test models of individual decision making. He got his PhD from NYU in 2009, lives in New York, works in New York and spends most of his time co-authoring with people who are or were at NYU.
When two players compete for a prize, they sometimes try to act as quickly as possible. At other times, they wait and see if the other person chooses to flee first. We study this interaction in the context of a dynamic fight-or-flight game. At each moment, a player can decide to wait, flee or fight. Players are privately informed about their strengths, which in case of a battle determine who wins the prize. In the case that one player flees and manages to escape, the other player earns the prize plus a “chase-away value”. We show that the chase-away value determines if fights occur immediately or only after a waiting period. In cases where the chase-away value is positive but not too large, players can use time to learn something about the type of the opponent, as the weaker players may find it advantageous to flee earlier in the game. Weaker players thereby avoid the risk of ending up in a fight. We derive conditions under which this is the case, and test this experimentally in the lab. Our findings support the idea that endogenous timing can reduce the likelihood of a fight compared to a static version of the game (where players decide simultaneously whether to fight or flee). We also observe many fights early on in the game, even if strong players would benefit from waiting.