We report an experiment designed to measure how (and how well) subjects choose between biased sources of instrumentally valuable information. Subjects choose between two information sources with opposing biases in order to inform their guesses of a binary state. By varying the nature of the bias, we vary whether it is optimal to consult sources biased towards or against subjects’ prior beliefs. We find that subjects frequently choose sub-optimal information sources, and that these mistakes can be described by a handful of well-defined decision rules. Most common among these is a confirmation-seeking rule that guides subjects to systematically choose information sources that are biased towards their priors. Analysis of post-experiment survey questions suggest that subjects follow these rules intentionally and find them normatively appealing. Combined with incentivized belief data and post-experiment cognitive tests, this suggests that mistakes like confirmation-seeking are driven by fundamental errors in reasoning about the informativeness of biased information sources.
We present results from laboratory experiments studying the impacts of affirmative action policies. We induce statistical discrimination in simple labor-market interactions between firms and workers. We then introduce affirmative-action policies that vary in the size and duration of a subsidy firms receive for hiring discriminated-against workers. These different affirmative-action policies have nearly the same effect and practically eliminate discriminatory hiring practices. However, once lifted, few positive effects remain and discrimination reverts to its initial levels. One exception is lengthy affirmative-action policies, which exhibit somewhat longer-lived effects. Stickiness of beliefs, which we elicit, helps explain the evolution of these outcomes.
I am an Assistant Professor in Economics at the Yale School of Management, an affiliated faculty member of the Department of Economics, and a research staff member of the Cowles Foundation. My research interests include organizational economics, the economics of innovation, and experimental economics, particularly focusing on how firms design compensation and performance evaluation schemes to motivate workers.
Axel Ockenfels is Professor of Economics at the University of Cologne, and Speaker of the University of Cologne Excellence Center for Social and Economic Behavior. His research focuses on market design and behavioral research. It has benefitted from various DFG funding programs and from various collaborations with governments, market platforms, companies and research institutions across Europe and the US.
Daniel Friedman joined the UCSC Economics faculty in 1985 after teaching at UCLA and UC Berkeley. He has broad research interests in applied economic theory, with emphasis on learning and evolution, laboratory experiments, and financial markets. The coauthor of five academic books, fourteen NSF grants, and roughly 100 research articles, he currently is studying a) financial market design, b) strategic behavior in real time, and c) evolutionary dynamics of continuous strategies or traits.
His popular book, Morals and Markets: An Evolutionary Perspective on the Modern World, was published by Palgrave-MacMillan in October 2008. A second paperback edition, co-authored with journalist Daniel McNeill, appeared in June 2013 with the subtitle: A Dangerous Balance.
In a large randomized controlled trial, we test the hypothesis that incentives for physical activity can improve academic performance. We found strong support for this hypothesis: University students who were incentivized to go to the gym had a significant improvement in academic performance, by, on average, 0.15 standard deviations compared to a control group that did not receive any incentives. The success of this indirect incentive for academic performance emphasizes the importance of non-cognitive skills in achieving academic goals. Students who were incentivized to exercise report improved self-control and a healthier life-style. Overall, the study demonstrates that incentivizing exercise can be an important tool in improving educational achievements.
Her research focuses on economic experiments based on game theory. She investigates how people strategically interact in various setups, for example, when some people can spy their opponent’s actions or when people can walk away from their partners and meet new ones. In another paper, Natalie also studies how people vary the amount of risk they take on behalf of other people, depending on what they learn about the outcome of their choices.
Social norms are a ubiquitous feature of social life and pervade almost every aspect of human social interaction. However, despite their importance, we still have relatively little empirical knowledge about the forces that drive the formation, the maintenance and the decay of social norms. In particular, our knowledge about how norms affect behavior and how norm obedience and violations shape subsequent normative standards is quite limited. Here, we present a new method that makes norms identifiable and continuously observable and, thus, empirically measurable. We show – in the context of public goods provision – the quick emergence of a widely accepted social cooperation norm that demands high contributions but – in the absence of the punishment of free-riders – norm violations are frequent and, therefore, the initial normative consensus as well as the high cooperation demands required by the norm break down. However, when peer punishment is possible, norm violations are rare from the beginning and a strong and stable normative consensus as well as high contribution requests prevail throughout. Thus, when norm compliance is costly social norms tend to unravel unless norm violations are kept to a minimum. In addition, our results indicate that – in an environment that has previously shown to be detrimental for cooperation and welfare – the opportunity to form a social norm unambiguously causes high public good contributions and group welfare when peer-punishment is possible.
192.168.1.1 is one of the most popular and default IP address for routers or ADSL modems. Different network brands use it as an access point or gateway to log in to the router. It is used to enter into admin panel where content is created, and the website is managed. There is some other IP address too which is used for same by routers like 192.168.0.1, 10.0.0.1, 192.168.1.2. These addresses are commonly called as the host address. 192.168.1.1 admin Starts from 192.168.0.0 and extends to 192.168.255.255.
192.168.1.1 Web-Interface Definition
Most of the routers have web-based configuration pages. These can be accessed in your browser as long as you are on the same local network as the router. You must know about the router’s web-interface because here, you can manage the website. You can also adjust network options and its security in web-interface. Also, you can protect your site from hackers who can steal your personal information for illegal use. If any problems occur, then it helps to troubleshoot the router. You will find many options like security options, proxy, LAN, WAN, DNS, WLAN setting, etc.
Logging in 192.168.1.1 web-interface?
IP address 192.168.1.1 is used by routers like Linksys (usually) and other networking brands. Linksys and every other router have individual web-based setup pages. These pages allow you to change configuration and settings, provided by your router software. Here we are giving steps to log in to Linksys router.
- STEP 1
First of all open any web browser like Google Chrome, Opera, etc. It doesn’t matter which browser you choose, just make sure it is not downloaded from third-party websites as it can harmonica your device and cause security problems.
- STEP 2
Type 192.168.1.1 into your browser’s address bar which is the default IP address for Linksys router’s, as mentioned above. If you don’t like this address, then manufacturers have had to develop some ways to change it. The easiest way is to launch particular setup CD. You can change it by using web-interface.
What If you forget changed IP address?
It can happen that you forgot the changed password. People always forget what they must remember. So to deal with this irritating problem here is an easy solution. Press RESET button present at the backside of the router and hold it for 15-30 seconds. This process is called as router resetting. Keep in mind that after you reset, router returns to factory default and all setting will be cleared. Router’s IP address will change back to 192.168.1.1. Also, note that resetting is essential to the process and is not recommended in other situations.
- STEP 3
Lastly, enter your username and password in the login window. By default, most of the routers and modems have username and password as admin. If you forgot the identification information, then type the newest login username and password. After you log in to your admin panel (web-interface), you will have access to admin panel. Now you can change the setting and configuration of the site and dig into network settings.
Andrea Robbett is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Middlebury College. She received her PhD from Caltech in 2011. Her research uses lab experiments to address topics related to public economics, labor economics, social dilemmas, and voting. This talk will focus on a series of experiments investigating expressive voting and rational ignorance among American political partisans.