

Autonomous vs. comparative status:

Must we be better than others to feel good about ourselves?

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## Abstract

Previous research has shown that people's self-esteem and their group-oriented behavior are influenced by their judgments about the status of the groups to which they belong (pride) and assessments of their status within those groups (respect). These findings are important to justice researchers because the key antecedent of such status judgments is typically found to be the assessment of the fairness of group procedures (i.e., procedural justice). Research suggests that (1) procedural justice shapes status and that (2) status shapes self-esteem and group-oriented behavior.

This article reports the results of three studies comparing two different forms of these status judgments. The first form are *autonomous* judgments of pride and respect that are linked to the characteristics associated with membership in different groups. People link such judgments to inclusion or membership in the group. The second are *comparative* judgments of pride and respect that are linked to comparisons of one's status to the status of other people or groups. The results indicate that, within groups, people are influenced primarily by autonomous assessments of status based on their internal standards, which develop from the status associated with prototypical characteristics linked to inclusion in a group. People are less strongly influenced by comparisons of their status to the status of external comparison standards. Further, justice-based status inferences are shown to be primarily autonomous, and not comparative, in nature.

Autonomous vs. comparative status:

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Recent studies suggest that people's group-based status judgments have an important influence on both their feelings about themselves and on their behaviors toward their group (Ellemers, 1993; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Blader, 2000a, 2001a; Tyler, DeGoey & Smith, 1996). These studies suggest that people are influenced by both their assessments of the status of groups to which they belong (i.e., pride--what the person thinks about the status of their group) and by their evaluations of their status within those groups (i.e., respect—what the person thinks about their status within the group; also called “social reputation”, see, Emler & Hopkins, 1990; Emler & Reicher, 1995; Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995; Seta & Seta, 1996). This work builds on the core ideas of social identity theory (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) by extending that body of intergroup research to intragroup dynamics. These findings suggest that people engage themselves in groups because they value the status that they gain by that connection.

What underlies these status evaluations? Research has shown procedural justice to be a central antecedent of status evaluations such as pride and respect (Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000a; Tyler, DeGoey & Smith, 1996). When they judge that their group's processes are fair, group members develop both (1) a sense of pride in their group and (2) a feeling that they are respected by the group. Importantly, these status appraisals have been shown to be more strongly influenced by procedural fairness judgments than by evaluations of either the favorability or the fairness of outcomes received from the group, affirming that procedural justice is a key antecedent of status evaluations. Further, much of the link between procedural

justice and group member's attitudes and behaviors (see Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988, Tyler & Lind, 1992, for reviews) can be accounted for by the impact of justice evaluations on status (Tyler & Blader, 2000a).

The link between procedural justice and status is based on a social identity-oriented understanding of the psychology of justice, articulated and demonstrated in the group-value model, (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), and the group engagement model of cooperation in group settings (Tyler & Blader, 2000a). This work emphasizes that people evaluate their relationships with their groups and organizations based on the fairness of the procedures they experience in their contact with those groups. Fair procedures therefore communicate an important message regarding relational concerns, leading group members to think: (1) that their group is of high status and (2) that they are of high status within the group. Both of these evaluations are believed to play a role in the construction and maintenance of a positive social identity, which is itself an important psychological objective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Together, these research findings indicate that procedural justice serves as the input from which people evaluate their pride in the group and their respect from the group, and that these status evaluations have important implications on both the self and the way that the self relates to the group. The link from procedural justice to status helps us to understand why people care about procedural justice and hence why procedural justice has such important organizational consequences. As a result, justice and status are key concepts to understanding the relationship between individuals and the groups they value, such as their work organizations (Tyler & Blader, 2000a, 2000b).

While prior findings support this status-oriented understanding of justice, they do not distinguish between two possible forms of status. Pride and respect can each take two different forms that differ in their referent standard of judgment. First, they may develop out of autonomous (or absolute) evaluations that use an internal standard, such as fit to group values and norms, for appraisal. This judgment is linked to inclusion or membership in a group. Second, they may be based on comparative (or relative) evaluations that utilize external standards to compare one's group or self to others.

When judgments are autonomous in nature, they are based on internal standards about what constitutes group membership or inclusion in the group. This occurs when people compare their experiences and themselves to the prototypical values, norms, and customs of their group (i.e., when they consider where they stand in terms of the standards that define the group) or when they use their personal values to judge their status--i.e., their inclusion or exclusion. For example, employees may evaluate their status in their work organizations (respect) by judging whether they are treated according to what they regard as the group's typical standards or whether their treatment meets their internal sense of what is appropriate. If so, they may then feel included within the group.

However, when status judgments are comparative in nature, social comparison processes dominate, and high status becomes defined in relative terms through comparison with external standards. In other words, comparative status develops when people compare themselves to others in the group (relative respect) or compare the status of the group to that of other groups (relative pride). These comparative judgments are the focus of models of social (Festinger, 1954; Suls & Miller, 1977; Suls & Wills, 1991) and temporal (Albert, 1977) comparison.

Examples may include when employees judge their status in their work organizations according to how the treatment they experience compares to those of their coworkers.

The studies reported here examine this distinction between autonomous and comparative status judgments and examine how they relate to previous research findings on the interface of procedural justice, status, and group-related outcomes. They do so with the goal of better understanding the nature of the influence of the various forms of status and how those different forms relate to procedural fairness evaluations. All three studies compare the influence of autonomous and comparative status judgments on organizational outcomes, to determine which types of status judgments are most predictive of behavior in organizational settings. In addition, studies two and three examine the relationship of procedural justice to status judgments. The complete interface of procedural justice, relative and absolute status, and organizational outcomes is tested in study three.

#### Autonomous and comparative status judgments

Autonomous judgments are based upon people's membership in a group (i.e. on inclusion or membership in a group), the cognitive component of identification (Deaux, 1996; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Oewerkerk, 1999; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). A core argument of social identity theory is that people use the groups in which they feel included to define their social selves. The valence attached to judgments about those groups therefore affects people's feelings about themselves as well as their attitudes and behaviors toward the group. Hence, when people are group members, they define themselves in terms of the group and determine their own self-worth and self-esteem through their evaluations of the group's characteristics. These judgments have been referred to as autonomous judgments (Hinkle & Brown, 1990).

In assessing pride or respect, past studies have defined status through the study of autonomous influences (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, DeGoey & Smith, 1996). Autonomous influences are those that flow from judgments about what constitutes prototypical group traits (in the case of pride) or attributes of members “in good standing” (in the case of respect). In both cases, individuals refer to their group related-schemas in the construction of their status judgments, rather than specific external references. While the findings of prior research support the autonomous approach and find strong influences of autonomous status evaluations on feelings about the self and group-oriented behaviors, those status assessments are potentially incomplete. In particular, social psychologists recognize that people often evaluate their abilities, attitudes, and status not autonomously, but through comparison to others (Suls & Miller, 1977; Suls & Wills, 1991). There is an extensive literature supporting social comparison theory, based upon the comparisons people make to other people, both within and outside of their own groups.

Similarly, social identity theory emphasizes that people are influenced by the comparisons they make between their groups and other groups (Abrams, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that “positive social identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons...between the in-group and some relevant out-group (p. 40)”. Similarly, “associated with [identification with a group] is a need for some positive distinctiveness, a need which is thought to often be satisfied through social comparisons [to other groups] to heighten differences between groups” (Oaker & Brown, 1986, p. 768). Together, both social comparison theory and social identity theory stress the role of comparisons for judgments regarding the self and the group.

However, other research suggests that people may not be as strongly guided by comparative judgments as suggested by these two literatures. For instance, it has been recognized that even in intergroup contexts comparisons are not the sole basis for social identification (Brown, Hinkle, Ely, Fox-Cardamone, Maras & Taylor, 1992; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). That is, in real world groups investigators have failed to consistently find a relationship between the degree of identification with a group and the extent to which groups are viewed as better than other groups (Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Further, when people are asked to determine whether they are happy, people rarely mention comparisons with other people or groups (Ross, Eyman, & Kishchuk, 1986).

It thus remains unclear whether group members rely on explicit comparative standards for judging the group's value or one's value within the group. Our concern is with examining this question with regard to status and determining how pride and respect judgments operate in organized settings. Specifically, we empirically examine the relative influence of autonomous and comparative pride and respect on organizational behavior.

#### Justice and autonomous vs. comparative judgments

The distinction between autonomous and comparative status evaluations is one with significant consequences for the functioning of groups and organizations. Autonomous judgments, since they are rooted in internal standards, can be unbounded in their distribution across people and situations. That is, one individual's positive status assessments do not come at the cost of others. Everyone can be included in a group at the same time.

Comparative judgments, on the other hand, necessarily involve a zero-sum approach to status; in order to have higher status than an external comparison standard, there must be people and groups of lower status. For there to be 'winners', there must be 'losers' (Kohn, 1999).

Thus, comparison-based evaluations of status fuel competition between individuals and groups, as the drive for status becomes tantamount to beating one's rivals. This competition over finite resources (such as status) has been argued to be bad for both the individuals within the group and the group as an entity (Kohn, 1993, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000a).

It has been argued that procedural justice-based approaches to managing groups provide a practical and beneficial means of developing and maintaining healthy group functioning (Tyler, 1991; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997). However, much of the potential of justice based strategies of conflict resolution would be lost if people's justice judgments were linked to comparative status judgments. Therefore, the viability of justice-based strategies of group engagement rely on a primacy of autonomous, over comparative, judgments.

The core argument underlying this notion is that procedural justice-based strategies encourage group members' engagement in their group even in the face of receiving outcomes from the group that are less than they desire (Tyler & Blader, 2000a). Since group resources are finite, their distribution involves the operation of a zero-sum game. Typically, not everyone can receive all the resources from the group that they desire. Nor can all group members depend on receiving all the resources that they may think that they deserve, since distributive justice perceptions are often biased in self-serving ways (Tyler et al., 1997). The viability of groups would be seriously questioned if people were to disengage from their groups as a consequence. Procedural justice, it has been argued, provides an alternative means of retaining involvement in the group even in the face of negative (or less than desirable) outcomes (Tyler, 1991), since the allocation of fairness in procedural actions need not be finite or limited. This involvement is both beneficial for the group and the individual (Tyler & Blader, 2000b).

Research has shown that the primary mechanism by which justice perceptions can be successful in maintaining group engagement is through the status implications that they convey (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000a; Tyler & Lind, 1988). Fair procedures communicate a message to group members of high status, or more specifically, of pride and respect. However, past research has primarily focused on the link between justice and autonomous status judgments, and has not examined the influence of justice on comparative status evaluations. It has been assumed, rather than tested, that autonomous judgments matter. This argument is addressed in studies 2 and 3, which examine the link between justice and status.

If justice were to be more strongly linked to status assessments of a comparative nature, then justice-based strategies of engagement might involve many of the same pitfalls as their instrumental counterparts. That is, the hope of justice-based strategies that we can create groups in which all members are motivated to cooperate could be dashed by the competitive nature of comparative status judgments. As an additional complication, some of the criterion of justice, such as neutrality, are inconsistent with a focus on comparative status, which implies a lack of "consistent, equal" treatment, thereby calling into question the validity of the justice evaluation itself.

Therefore, it is important to empirically test the nature of the status judgments to which procedural justice is most strongly related, in order to verify whether justice-based strategies do in fact provide a viable alternative to zero-sum, instrumental approaches to group engagement. The links between procedural justice and status are examined in studies 2 and 3.

#### Self-esteem and group-oriented behaviors

In this study, we examine how pride and respect influence the individual's sense of themselves as well as their group-oriented behavior. Prior studies suggest that autonomous

measures of status influence both personal and collective self-esteem. Collective self-esteem reflects feelings about the self-relevant implications of group memberships (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992)<sup>1</sup>. In this study, we focus on the identity subscale of collective self esteem, which reflects the degree to which people draw their identity from group membership, or their ‘psychological engagement’ in the group (Tyler & Blader, 2000a, 2001a). This type of identification is distinct from pride and respect, but should be affected by those status evaluations. People ought to strategically draw more of their identity from group information when that information is more favorable.

A separate issue is the influence of status judgments on group-oriented behavior. Previous research using autonomous status judgments has shown that status influences the degree to which people behave in ways that promote the welfare of groups (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Tyler & DeGoey, 1995). In this study, two types of group oriented behavior are examined: limiting behaviors and promoting behaviors (Tyler & Blader, 2000a). While these two types of behavior may be interrelated, there are important theoretical and empirical distinctions between them (Tyler and Blader, 2000a, 2001b).

Limiting behavior refers to people’s willingness to act on the group’s behalf by refraining from behaviors that might damage the group, although they could potentially benefit the individual. People may simply engage in these behaviors as an act of conformity, or, alternatively, they may view group authorities, and the rules they enforce, as legitimate (Tyler, 1997) and feel an internal obligation to support them (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Both conformity and its more voluntary form, deference, are considered limiting behaviors, as both represent cases of

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<sup>1</sup> The other subscales are not considered because they conceptually overlap with pride and respect. The private subscale, like pride, is linked to judgments about group status, while the public and membership subscales, like respect, are linked to status within groups.

people limiting themselves from doing things that may benefit themselves but hurt the group.

This emphasis on people's willingness to conform or comply with group rules and norms reflects the types of intragroup behavior explored in recent social identity and self-categorization research (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993). More importantly, it represents the original purpose of social identity theory - explaining the uniformity of people's behavior in groups (Brown, 1988). We expect both judgments of pride and respect to be related to limiting behavior.

Promoting behaviors are individually initiated behaviors intended to benefit the group by helping the group achieve its goals. They may include behaviors as diverse as conserving energy by turning out lights and coming in to work on Saturday because a project must be completed. Further, they can include the effort which one puts into performing their specified task roles (in role behavior) or the engagement in behaviors that help the group but are not specified as part of an individual's responsibilities (extra role behavior). In both cases, individuals are engaging in behaviors that help the group achieve its goals out of some degree of their own volition, since people even have latitude with regard to the effort they put into their performance of in-role behavior. Promoting behavior has been the focus of the helping behavior and social dilemma literatures within social psychology (Dawes, 1980; Komorita & Parks, 1994) and of organizational behavior research (Fahr, Podsakoff & Organ, 1990; Konovsky & Folger, 1991; Organ, 1988, 1990; Smith, Organ & Near, 1983; Van Dyne, Graham & Dienesch, 1994).

Importantly, there are other types of group behavior that may also be impacted by status evaluations. For instance, one behavioral issue is whether or not people try to leave their groups (intergroup mobility). This issue has been studied by a variety of researchers (Ellemers, Spears

& Doosje, 1997; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). We consider this issue in study three, our study of employees in work organizations<sup>2</sup>.

We investigate the question of autonomous and comparative evaluations of pride and respect in three studies. Each explores the impact of autonomous and comparative judgments of pride and respect upon: 1) how people feel and think about themselves and 2) group-oriented behaviors. The first study examines undergraduates making evaluative judgments about their own university. The second explores justice and status evaluations and behaviors among members of university cooperative housing units. The third study investigates judgments made by employees regarding their work situations, examining the impact of status and the relationship of procedural justice to status. All studies are based upon questionnaire responses that examine the naturally occurring relationship between autonomous and comparative judgments of pride and respect, feelings about the self, and the occurrence of group-oriented behaviors.

### Study one

The purpose of study one is to examine autonomous and comparative judgments of status. Two questions are addressed: (1) whether people distinguish between autonomous and comparative judgments of pride and respect, and (2) which of these judgments influence self-esteem and group-oriented behavior.

### Method

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<sup>2</sup> We do not consider intergroup mobility in studies one and two because they examine University students whose time within their groups is constrained from the outset by their imminent graduation. In such cases, intergroup mobility are strongly affected by factors unrelated to group status.

Subjects. Three hundred and eighty undergraduates at the University of California at Berkeley completed a questionnaire as part of a course requirement for introductory psychology. The questionnaire was administered in groups of no more than 10 subjects.

Measures. Scales measuring autonomous pride, autonomous respect, comparative pride, comparative respect, personal self-esteem, collective self-esteem, promoting behavior, and limiting behavior were all included in the survey instrument. The items that composed these scales are presented in the Appendix. Means, standard deviations, scale reliabilities and the relationship among the scales is shown in Table 1. It is worth noting that, in this study, the reliability coefficients for collective self-esteem, limiting behavior, and promoting behavior were moderate in size, suggesting that the proportion of explained variance may be attenuated for these dependent variables.

INCLUDE TABLE 1 HERE

## Results

The students interviewed were found to identify with the university. When asked whether their university membership was important to the way they thought of themselves as a person, 81% said yes. Further, 80% indicated that they identified with the universities' "educational mission". Hence, the students interviewed identified strongly with the university.

Autonomous and comparative status judgments. The first question to be addressed is whether the distinction between pride and respect and between autonomous and comparative judgments, outlined in the introduction, is empirically demonstrated in the judgments made by the participants. Since these are new constructs and not previously researched in the literature, we used exploratory factor analysis for this first investigation into this question.

A principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation confirms the hypothesized structure by identifying the four predicted factors. These factors are shown in Table 2. The results confirm that the the autonomous /comparative distinction with regard to pride and respect represents separate evaluations in the minds of these respondents.

INCLUDE TABLE 2 HERE

Promotive and limiting behaviors represent two different research traditions (see Tyler & Blader, 2000a). However, it is possible that they represent a single set of "pro-group behaviors" rather than two different types of behaviors. Therefore, it is also important to test the structure of the dependent variables. A factor analysis of the type already outlined suggests that these two types of behavior do form two separate factors, which together explain 49% of the total variance between the items. Importantly, the two factors are distinct ( $r = -.11$ , n.s.).

Autonomous and comparative influences on self esteem & group behaviors. The next question to be addressed is the relation between autonomous and comparative judgments, self-esteem and group-related behaviors. Regression analysis was used to address this question. In the analysis, comparative and autonomous judgments of pride and respect were used to predict the four dependent variables--individual self-esteem, collective self-esteem (identity), promoting behavior and limiting behavior<sup>3</sup>.

The results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 3. Beta weights are shown for each of the four elements when all four are considered simultaneously. In addition, the unique contribution of each category (i.e., the  $\Delta R^2$  associated with autonomous and comparative evaluations) of judgment is shown. In the case of personal self-esteem, both autonomous and

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<sup>3</sup> The results of the analyses for comparative pride judgments that have either a specific (i.e. Stanford) or general (i.e. other universities) referent suggest that both approaches lead to similar results. It made no difference whether participants were making comparative evaluations using a particular rival university as their comparison or

comparative status judgments had a significant influence (unique contribution = 13% for autonomous judgments; 8% for comparative judgment). These findings suggest that personal self-esteem is strongly affected by both comparative and autonomous judgments. However, collective self-esteem--identity is primarily related to autonomous judgments (unique contribution is 19% for autonomous judgments; 0% for comparative), as are limiting behaviors (4% for autonomous judgments, 0% for comparative judgments) and promoting behaviors (8% for autonomous judgments, 1% for comparative judgments).

INCLUDE TABLE 3 HERE

### Discussion

The findings of study one suggest that in group settings, autonomous judgments of status may be important in shaping self-esteem and group behavior. Such autonomous judgments are linked to personal and collective self-esteem and to promoting and limiting group-oriented behavior. In addition, comparative judgments are found to have an important influence on personal self-esteem and a lesser, but significant, influence on promoting behavior.

One potential caution to these results is the question of whether the “autonomous” judgments involved were completely autonomous. People might have been making implicit comparisons. However, the results of the factor analysis on the two types of judgments distinguished between explicit comparisons and autonomous judgments. It is not clear that this separation would have occurred if the autonomous judgments were implicitly comparative, although such a distinction might still be possible. Furthermore, it is striking that when comparisons are made explicit the influence of the resulting judgments does not increase relative

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universities in general. Since general evaluations do not restrict the respondent to a particular type of comparison, we will present the analysis using general comparative judgments.

to that of autonomous judgments. This suggests that implicit comparisons do not play a central role in the impact of status judgments in intragroup settings.

Study two examines the influence of autonomous and comparative judgments on self-esteem and group-oriented behavior in a new context: university cooperative housing organizations. Cooperative housing organizations are small residential units which are semiautonomous and self-governing. In study two, respondents are making comparisons between a small group of residential units within the context of a single large university.

### Study two

#### Method

One hundred and ninety-three undergraduate students (80 men and 113 women) living in cooperative housing units on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley participated in a study for which they received ten dollars. During the first session of a multisession study they completed questionnaires about their cooperative and other cooperatives at the university. They did so in the context of a study on “how being a member of a cooperative house is related to what you generally think of your house and how you view yourself as a person”. Participants were interviewed in their homes during dinner hour with the consent of house managers.

Measures. Scales assessing autonomous pride, comparative pride, autonomous respect, comparative respect, personal self-esteem, collective self-esteem, limiting behavior, and promoting behavior were all included in the survey instrument. The items used in these scales are presented in the appendix.

#### Results

Means, standard deviations, scale reliabilities, and the relationship among the scales is shown in Table 4.

As in study one, the findings in the case of study two verify that residents identified with their coops. When asked if belonging to their cooperative was an important reflection of who they are, 75% of members agreed. Hence, this is a setting in which participants were clearly involved in a group which shaped their sense of themselves.

INCLUDE TABLE 4 HERE

Autonomous and comparative status judgments. Based on the results of the exploratory factor analysis in study one, confirmatory factor analysis was used to more formally test the hypothesized structure of the status judgments measured in this study. A four factor model, composed of autonomous and comparative judgments of both pride and respect, was fit to the data. The resulting model demonstrated good fit (see Table 5), supporting the assertion that autonomous and comparative judgments of within and between group status each represent separate judgments.

INCLUDE TABLE 5 HERE

The fit of the four-factor model was also compared with that of alternative models. Two alternatives were considered: a two-factor model based solely on the distinction between pride and respect, and another two-factor model based solely on the distinction between autonomous and comparative judgments. Neither model demonstrated as good fit to the data as the four factor model (see Table 5). These results suggest that the four hypothesized status judgments best represent the way that these respondents conceptualized their status evaluations. Neither the pride/respect nor the absolute/comparative distinctions alone provided as good a characterization of respondents' status judgments.

An exploratory factor analysis was also conducted on the items used to assess promoting and limiting behaviors. Again, as in study one, a varimax-rotated factor analysis revealed the two predicted factors.

Autonomous and comparative influences on self esteem and group behaviors.

Regression analyses were used to test the relationship between the comparative and autonomous status judgments and the dependent variables. The results, shown in Table 6, are quite similar to those of study one. As in study one, autonomous status judgments are the dominant predictor of personal self-esteem (explaining 9% of the unique variance, as opposed to 1% for comparative judgments), collective self esteem (explaining 34% of the unique variance, as opposed to 0% for comparative judgments) and limiting behavior (explaining 10% of the unique variance, as opposed to 1% for comparative judgments). Unlike the results from study 1, comparative judgments did not have a significant influence on personal self esteem in study 2.

On the other hand, in this study comparative judgments were the dominant predictors of promoting behaviors (explaining 13% of the unique variance, as opposed to 7% for autonomous judgments). Interestingly, in both studies one and two the comparative influences that are found flow from comparative judgments of respect, not pride. Hence, they focus on status within the group, relative to the status of other group members. There is no significant influence of feeling that one's group is better than other groups.

INCLUDE TABLE 6 HERE

Justice and status. In this study people were also asked about the fairness of their cooperative group. The four-item index of procedural justice of the group (e.g., "How fair are the methods that [your coop] uses to resolve conflicts?") was found to be linked to status, with those who viewed group procedures as fairer indicating more autonomous pride ( $r = 0.37$ ,  $p <$

.001); more comparative pride ( $r = 0.29$ ,  $p < .001$ ); more autonomous respect ( $r = 0.39$ ,  $p < .001$ ); but not more comparative respect ( $r = 0.14$ , n.s.). These results indicate a stronger association between procedural justice and autonomous status than between procedural justice and comparative status.

### Discussion

The findings of study two strongly support those of study one. As in study one, autonomous judgments were found to be closely linked to self-esteem and group-oriented behavior. This was true of both personal and collective self-esteem, as well as limiting and promoting behaviors. Promoting behavior was also related to comparative judgments. Those who felt that their cooperative was better than others were more likely to help that coop achieve its goals. On the other hand, personal self-esteem was not linked to comparative judgments, as it was in study one. The results also indicate tentative evidence that procedural justice evaluations are more closely linked to absolute—as opposed to comparative—judgments of status.

Both studies one and two demonstrate that autonomous judgments of status are more important for predicting group behaviors and individual reactions to group membership than are comparative judgments of status. Both demonstrated these effects by examining university students and their relationship to two different groups of high importance to them. In study three, we extend this analysis by considering the influence of autonomous and comparative judgments in a work organization. In study three, respondents are employees, reporting on their perceptions of their work organizations and their behavior within those organizations.

In study 3, we also more fully address a second goal of this article, that of examining the relationship between justice perceptions and status judgments. To do so, we asked respondents to report their evaluations of their organization's fairness and of the favorability of the resources

they receive from their organizations. We also collected assessments of absolute and comparative status as well as the outcomes of promoting and limiting behaviors, organizational identification (a construct similar to the collective self esteem—identity measures in studies one and two), and their behavioral intention of remaining with the group. This data enable us to replicate the findings of studies one and two and to test whether justice-based strategies of cooperation operate best via autonomous or comparative status judgments.

### Study three

#### Method

Sample. Five hundred and forty (540) employees from around the US working for a financial services firm responded to a survey regarding their work organization. A total of 1400 surveys were distributed, resulting in a response rate of approximately 39%, a typical response rate for this type of survey (Dillman, 2000). The sample was divided evenly by gender (45% male, 50% female and 5% not reporting gender). The mean age in the sample was 42 years old and respondents averaged 13 years with the organization. The demographics of the respondent sample closely resembled that of all those receiving surveys, with the overall group composed of 41% males having an average tenure of 13 years and an average age of 43 years. No systematic differences were detected between the general sample and those responding to the survey.

Surveys were distributed to employees via interoffice mail services and returned directly to the experimenters using pre-addressed, postage paid envelopes. Respondents were permitted to complete the survey while at work. All responses were completely confidential.

Measures. Scales assessing autonomous pride, comparative pride, autonomous respect, comparative respect, procedural justice, distributive justice, outcome favorability, promoting

behavior, limiting behavior, identification, and intention to remain with the organization. The items composing each scale are presented in the appendix.

## Results

Scale means, standard deviations, coefficient alphas, and the intercorrelations between scales are located in Table 7.

INCLUDE TABLE 7 HERE

Autonomous and comparative status judgments. As in study two, confirmatory factor analysis was again used to test the hypothesized structure of the status judgments. A four factor model, composed of autonomous and comparative judgments of both pride and respect, was fit to the data and demonstrated good fit (see Table 8), once again supporting our argument that autonomous and comparative judgments of within and between group status each represent separate judgments.

INCLUDE TABLE 8 HERE

The fit of the four-factor model was again compared with two alternative models: a two factor model based solely on the distinction between pride and respect, and another two factor model based solely on the distinction between autonomous and comparative judgments. Neither model demonstrated as good fit to the data as the four factor model (see Table 8). These results again suggest that the four hypothesized status judgments best represent the way that these respondents conceptualized their status evaluations, and that neither the pride/respect nor the absolute/comparative distinctions alone provided as good a characterization of respondents' status judgments.

Antecedents of status judgments. We used regression analysis to test the extent to which procedural justice, distributive justice and outcome favorability are related to the four status

judgments. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 9. As that table indicates, procedural justice and outcome favorability are both related to all four status judgments, while distributive justice does not demonstrate a significant positive relation to any of these judgments. Procedural justice was by far the dominant influence on both autonomous status judgments, replicating previous research on the link between perceptions of process fairness and group-relevant status evaluations.

INCLUDE TABLE 9 HERE

On the other hand, the results indicate that procedural justice had a weaker relation to the comparative status judgments. This is reflected in the far greater magnitude of the beta weights associated with procedural justice in the autonomous judgment analyses as compared to the comparative judgments. The weakest effect occurs with comparative judgments of respect. This parallels the finding of study two, in which comparative judgments of respect also fail to be strongly linked to issues of procedural justice.

Additionally, far more variance is explained among the autonomous status judgments than the comparative judgments in these analyses. This difference in the variance explained by these predictors can be linked to the differential relationship between procedural justice evaluations and the dependent variables. The unique variance explained by outcome favorability does not shift between the two types of status judgments (autonomous and comparative) whereas the unique variance explained by procedural justice is dramatically smaller in the case of the comparative judgments. Together, these results clearly indicate that the status judgments that derive from procedural justice evaluations are primarily autonomous in nature.

Consequences of status judgments. Regression analyses were also used to examine the influence of autonomous and comparative status judgments on the organizational dependent

variables. These results, shown in Table 10, are largely consistent with those of studies one and two. Autonomous judgments of pride and respect are the dominant predictors of these dependent variables, with autonomous pride having the largest effect of all the predictors (promoting behavior  $\beta=.20$ ; limiting behavior  $\beta=.26$ ; identification  $\beta=.47$ ; and intention to remain with the organization  $\beta=.36$ ; all  $p<.01$ ) and a significant influence of autonomous respect in all cases except for identification. These influences are complemented, however, by significant positive influences of comparative respect on promoting behaviors ( $\beta = .10$ ,  $p<.05$ ) and identification ( $\beta = .15$ ,  $p<.001$ ) with the organization.

#### INCLUDE TABLE 10 HERE

Overall, the autonomous judgments are the best predictors of the four dependent variables outlined--promoting behavior, limiting behavior, identification, and intent to remain in the group. Comparison of the unique variance explained by the autonomous versus comparative judgments as a set shows a clear advantage towards the autonomous status evaluations for each of the outcomes examined. For each of the dependent variables, the autonomous status assessments explain several times the amount of unique variance as that accounted for by the comparative indices. Overall, the average unique variance explained by autonomous judgments was 7%, while the unique variance explained by comparative judgments was only 1%.

Testing the justice—status—organizational outcomes model. To test both hypothesized linkages of the model (1) from justice to status and (2) from status to organizational outcomes, a structural equation model (AMOS, Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999) analysis was conducted. The four organizational outcomes--promoting behavior, limiting behavior, turnover intention, and identification--were each considered separately. Each type of status judgment (autonomous, comparative) was based on two indicators, one for pride and one for respect. Finally, three

judgments about organizational culture were included: the fairness of organizational procedures, the fairness of organizational outcomes, and the favorability of organizational outcomes.

In the model, each of the three judgments of organizational culture was allowed to directly influence both categories of status as well as each of the four organizational dependent variables. In addition, each form of status was linked to all four of the outcome variables. The resulting model is shown in Figure 1, where only paths with significant coefficients are presented. As that figure indicates, there was no direct influence of procedural justice or the other organizational culture variables on promoting behavior, limiting behavior, turnover intention, or identification. Furthermore, although procedural justice was linked to both types of status judgments, autonomous status was the only one to have a significant link to the four outcome variables. This model fits the data very well (NFI= 0.962; CFI = 0.965). It supports the suggestion that the key factor shaping organizational outcomes are autonomous, as opposed to comparative, judgments of status. Those judgments, in turn, are strongly influenced by evaluations of the procedural justice of the workplace.

#### INCLUDE FIGURE 1 HERE

The results presented in Figure 1 indicate that there are no significant linkages between comparative judgments and the four organizational dependent variables when autonomous status judgments are accounted for. However, the results do not directly compare the magnitude of the association between autonomous and comparative judgments and these organizational outcomes. That is, are the effects of autonomous judgments on these dependent variables significantly greater than the effects of comparative judgments? To test this, paths leading from the autonomous and comparative factors to each of the dependent variables were constrained to be equal to one another. For instance, the two paths leading from the autonomous and comparative

factors to promoting behaviors were set to be equivalent. If the effect of autonomous versus comparative judgments on each dependent variable is significantly different, constraining them to equivalency should lead to a reduction in model fit. The results of these four equivalency constraints did indeed lead to an overall reduction in model fit ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 25.59$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < .01$ ). This result indicates that not only are there no statistically significant linkages between comparative judgments and these dependent variables, but also that the effects of autonomous judgments on these dependent variables are significantly greater than those of comparative judgments.

The model in Figure 1 directly tests the primary distinction addressed in this article—that between autonomous and comparative status judgments—by including latent factors assessing each of these classes of status judgments. However, in considering the model, it is important to consider that the two factor measurement model presented in Table 8 that distinguishes solely between autonomous and comparative judgments did not fit the data particularly well. Therefore, we also analyzed a model in which all four indicators (relative and absolute pride, relative and absolute respect) were treated as distinct indices. That analysis revealed significant paths between autonomous respect and promoting behavior, limiting behavior, and turnover intention. Autonomous pride was likewise significantly linked to limiting behavior, turnover intention, and identification. Among the comparative judgments, however, the only statistically significant linkage was between comparative respect and identification. This confirms the point that these four organizationally-important variables are primarily linked to autonomous—and not comparative—status judgments.

## Discussion

The results of study three both complement and extend the findings of studies one and two. As in both of those studies, strong effects were found in study three for the influence of autonomous status judgments of pride and respect on group-oriented behavior as well as on identification, a construct similar to collective self esteem. These results again indicate that people engage in behaviors that help the group achieve its goals, refrain from behaviors that would harm the group's functioning and identify with the group, all primarily as a function of their autonomous status evaluations.

Comparative judgments exerted a somewhat similar influence in study three as well. Comparative respect was shown to be related to engagement in promoting behaviors, a relationship also found in studies one and two. Apparently, people engage more in promoting behaviors, to some extent, when they perceive that they are among the most highly respected members of their group. A similar effect was found for identification with the organization. Just as in studies one and two, we find that the comparative status judgments that matter are relevant to intragroup, and not intergroup, assessments. That is, once again the influence of comparative judgments is occurring within the borders of the group, with little influence of comparisons to other groups. The influence of comparative judgments in this data should not be overstated. In both cases the relative magnitude of the relationship between comparative respect and the dependent variables is small, and comparative judgments explain little of the variance beyond that explained by autonomous judgments.

It was also empirically determined in study three that conceptualizing status according to autonomous and comparative pride and respect provides a good description of how people naturally cluster their status concerns. These results validate the basic premise that people make

separate evaluations of status according to these four categories. Furthermore, they confirm the exploratory analyses in studies one and two which also indicated that the elements of status judgments clustered according to these four categories.

Study three expands on studies one and two in several ways. First, a new dependent variable was examined, intention to remain with the group. The results indicate strong effects for autonomous judgments on this dependent variable, and no significant influence of comparative judgments. Therefore, it seems that people plan to stay with their groups when they make positive autonomous status judgments with regard to those groups, but their comparative status judgments have little influence on those intentions. This finding broadens the range of outcomes to which autonomous status judgments are linked.

Second, study three consisted of employees reporting on their relationships with their work organizations, and therefore extended our investigation into one of the key and predominant influences on people's lives. Importantly, the essential set of findings from the examinations of university students were maintained across this change in context and population.

Third, study three examined the antecedents of the four group-relevant status evaluations and found that procedural justice was most closely linked with autonomous status judgments and less so with comparative evaluations. This critical finding clarifies the nature of previous research on the influence of procedural justice on status (e.g. Tyler & Blader, 2000a). The message regarding status conveyed via fair processes is primarily one about the value of the group, and one's value within the group, in an absolute sense. Procedural fairness does not necessarily convey a message that oneself, or one's group, is superior to others, but rather communicates an autonomous message of self- and group-worth.

These results support the viability of justice-based strategies of cooperation in groups without assuming the risks associated with the competitive nature of comparative judgments. Indeed, they show those comparative judgments to be relatively ineffective in gaining such cooperation and to be less consistent with the spirit of process fairness.

### General discussion

The findings of the studies reported here support the suggestion that autonomous status judgments are the primary type of status judgment that is influential in intragroup settings. Across the twelve judgments made in these three studies the average unique variance explained by autonomous judgments was 11%, while it was less than 3% for comparative judgments. Furthermore, the results of both study two and study three confirm that autonomous judgments are more strongly linked with procedural justice evaluations than are comparative judgments (especially in the case of respect). Study three provides direct evidence that the influence of procedural justice judgments is mediated by judgments of autonomous, but not comparative, status.

These findings suggest that the primary way that status in organized groups shapes people's feelings about themselves and their behavior toward those groups is through feelings of inclusion or membership in the group and via internal standards of judgment. For example, it appears that people focus primarily upon whether or not they are members "in good standing" and not on whether they are in 'better standing' than other group members. If they feel that they belong to the group, they are influenced by their autonomous assessments of both the status of their group (pride) and their status within the group.

Comparative status assessments, or the extent to which people feel that their group is better than others or that they are more respected than their in-group cohorts, are relatively less

effective in determining feelings about the self or group behavior. The most influential comparative judgment is that of comparative respect. For instance, people may have higher self esteem if they feel that they are more respected than other members of their group. This judgment is, however, an intragroup judgment. People seem to not be influenced by intergroup comparisons of their pride in their group to their potential pride from belonging to other groups.

One important caution about our findings is that it is not possible to show that autonomous judgments do not involve any sort of implicit comparison. That is, in making autonomous judgments, people may be making comparisons with specific referents that are implicit rather than explicit. While this possibility cannot be ruled out, it is clear that comparisons are more explicit when they are presented directly to respondents. Since these explicit judgments did not dominate either self-esteem or group-oriented behavior, we can likely conclude that comparisons are not central to status evaluations. It is therefore likely that when making autonomous judgments, people are primarily comparing themselves or their groups to internal standards of what a good group or a group member should be, rather than making implicit comparisons (c.f., Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993). This conclusion is empirically confirmed by factor analysis, which in each study indicated that autonomous and comparative judgments are, in fact, conceptually distinct. Similarly, if the two judgments were not conceptually distinct, no unique effects for either would have emerged when they were entered into the simultaneous regression analyses presented in all three studies.

Further research should also address some of the methodological limits of these studies. Of particular concern is the reliance on self-report. The use of independent measures of behavior would help to demonstrate that common method variance is not at the root of the findings outlined. However, although such issues are of concern, it is difficult to see how the pattern of

impact found here could be due to common method variance, since some of the factors measured using the common method show high levels of influence, and other show little influence.

Common method variance should lead to one general finding of influence, without a differential influence of the subscales used in this study. Nonetheless, this line of argument would benefit from linking self-report to objective measures of behavior.

### Links between autonomous and comparative judgements

In extolling the virtues of autonomous judgments, we assume that autonomous and comparative judgments are distinct concepts. That suggestion is supported by the results of the factor analyses conducted, which find distinct comparative and autonomous factors. However, the concepts are not independent. In study one the correlation between the two types of judgments was  $r = 0.51$ , while in study two it was  $r = 0.39$ . In study three, the average correlation between the respective autonomous and comparative judgments of pride and respect was 0.63. To some extent, then, people who perceive high comparative status, e.g., who see themselves as more respected than other group members, will likely also see themselves as having high autonomous status.

This association is somewhat intuitive, since having a sense that you are one of the most respected members of your group should often coincide with feeling that you are a respected member of the group in an autonomous sense. Nevertheless, they are distinct judgments. One can certainly imagine situations where individuals may see themselves as high in comparative respect yet still have the sense that the group as an entity does not meet their internal standards of what they would term 'respectfulness'. For instance, people often complain of bosses who are interpersonally disrespectful to all of their employees, although they nevertheless treat particular individuals better than they treat others.

In a discussion of social identity theory, Brewer (1991) suggests that people seek a balance between defining themselves in terms of group memberships and creating a unique personal identity. They seek an optimal distinctiveness. Brewer's analysis is concerned with the balance of social and personal aspects of identity. A similar balance may occur between autonomous and comparative inputs into the formation of the self. That is, people may need to identify both aspects of themselves that they evaluate in autonomous terms (I am good or bad on this dimension) and aspects of themselves that they evaluate in comparative terms (I am better or worse than others). The current set of findings suggest that both types of judgments may have an important influence, particularly in the formation of self-esteem and promoting behavior.

Future research should examine the contingencies that affect the balance of comparative and autonomous influences, particularly since comparative influences have been found in social identity research. There are two notable differences between this research context and the contexts typically studied by social identity researchers. First, the subjects are not in a "zero-sum game", unlike the typical minimal group experiment in which participants distribute a set number of points between ingroup and outgroup members. Second, there is no clear threat to people's self-esteem - participants had not learned that they or their group had failed or that they were peripheral group members (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Brown & Wade, 1987; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Mussweiler, Gabriel & Bodenhausen, 2000). Perhaps in these circumstances comparative judgments become much more important. It should be noted, however, that self enhancement strategies may also decrease the focus on comparative judgments in cases where a threat to self-esteem is due to low group status, since such comparisons could involve negative consequences for the self (Crocker & Major, 1989; Miller & Prentice, 1997).

Implications for justice research

The findings of studies 2 and 3 support the argument that a key antecedent of status is justice. Study 3 is particularly important, because it compares procedural justice, distributive justice, and outcome favorability as potential antecedents of status. In study 3 the primary antecedent of both autonomous and comparative status was procedural justice. Of course, procedural justice was not the only antecedent of status. People also respond to the favorability of their outcomes. However, these findings provide support for the argument that procedural justice is a key antecedent of status judgments.

The procedural justice literature has been motivated by the consistent finding that procedural justice is a key antecedent of important organizational behaviors (Tyler, 2000). These findings support that general suggestion, and provide some clarification about how and why that procedural justice effect occurs. If people regard the procedures of their organization as fair, they are more likely to express pride in group membership, and to feel respected by others in their group. Hence, procedural justice communicates favorable status-relevant information that encourages people to engage themselves in groups. This set of studies makes clear that that engagement is not contingent on comparative judgments of status.

These findings support the view of justice researchers who advocate the utility of justice-based strategies for eliciting engagement by group members in the group. The results indicate that fairness primarily expresses a sense of status that is autonomous, and not comparative, in nature. These results support the viability of justice-based strategies, since autonomous status need not be finite in its allotment across people. Thus, it appears that justice-based strategies can indeed be utilized to avoid the negative consequences associated with competition over finite resources in group settings.

### Conclusions

The findings outlined confirm the validity of the approach taken to studying justice and status by past research (e.g. Tyler & Blader, 2000a; Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996). The results suggest that autonomous status judgments are antecedents shaping self-esteem and group-oriented behaviors, and that procedural justice perceptions determine evaluations of autonomous status judgments more so than comparative judgments. On the other hand, clear comparative effects were found on self-esteem and with promoting behavior. Hence, it is possible that previous research may have somewhat underestimated the full spectrum of status influences on self-esteem and group-oriented behavior, since it has not captured comparative judgments. However, even in this study, autonomous effects are far more influential than comparative effects.

Autonomous effects are important because they suggest the possibility of a “win-win” situation within groups. Everyone can feel good about themselves if the basis for such feelings is autonomous. On the other hand, comparative judgments unavoidably lead to competition and conflict. For some group members to feel superior to others, and for some groups themselves to feel superior to others, there inevitably will be those people or groups that feel inferior. These findings, therefore, suggest a more optimistic conclusion about the nature of individual and group relations than would be supported if people were more strongly influenced by, and motivated to engage in, comparative judgments.

While some competitive pressures will always be found, there is also substantial potential to develop both positive feelings about the self and to elicit positive group-oriented behaviors through autonomous means. People are not simply prisoners of a competitive social dynamic. They can be affected by autonomous judgments about the quality of their lives. Thus, justice- and status-based strategies for understanding and promoting engagement in groups may appear

to provide a viable alternative to the competitive, zero-sum approaches that have dominated the social and organizational research literatures.

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## Appendix

### Measures, Study 1

Unless otherwise noted, participants rated their agreement from agree (1) to disagree (7).

Autonomous pride. Eight items were used to assess autonomous pride: “I cannot think of another university I would rather attend”, “I am proud to think of myself as a member of the UCB community”, “When someone praises the accomplishments of a member of the UCB community, I feel like it is a personal compliment to me”, “I talk up UCB to my friends as a good place to go to school”, “I feel good when people describe me as a typical UCB student”, “I often think about transferring (R)”, “I will probably look for an alternative university in the next year (R)” and “When someone asks me what university I attend, I wish I did not have to tell them” (R).

Autonomous respect. Five items were used to assess autonomous respect: “If they knew me well, most members of the UCB community would: 1) respect my values, 2) think I have accomplished a great deal in my life, 3) approve of how I live my life these days”, “I believe most members of the UCB community respect me”, and “I believe that I make a good impression on other members of the UCB community”.

Comparative pride. Comparative pride was measured by asking about pride in the University of California at Berkeley (UCB) compared to other universities. Four items were used to assess general comparative pride: “How does the reputation of UCB compare to the reputation of other universities?”, “How does the work done by students and faculty at UCB compare to the work being done by students and faculty at other universities?”, “How do the accomplishments of the students and faculty at UCB compare with the accomplishments of the students and faculty at other universities”, and “How does the value of a UCB education compare to the value of an education from other universities”. Participants rated their opinion of each item on a scale ranging from “UCB is much worse” (1) to “UCB is much better” (7).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> We also made this assessment using a specific referent, as is done in experimental intergroup research in which the salience of membership in one group is made through reference to specific outgroups (e.g. Long, Spears & Manstead, 1994; Smith, Spears & Oyen, 1994). The specific referent judgment asked students to compare UCB to their most salient “natural rival”, Stanford University. Through a series of competitive events, such as an annual football game, UCB and Stanford have developed a well-established tradition of competitive rivalry. Three items were used to assess pride in comparison to the specific referent (Stanford): “How does the reputation of UCB compare to the reputation of Stanford”, “How does the work being done at UCB compare to the work being done at Stanford”, and “How does the value of a UCB education compare to the value of a Stanford education” (alpha =

Comparative respect. Three items were used to assess comparative respect: “How do your accomplishments compare to the accomplishments of the average UCB student?”, “How are you doing compared to the average UCB student?”, and “To what extent are you better off or worse off than the average UCB student?”. Participants rated their opinion of each item on a scale ranging from “I am much worse” (1) to “I am much better” (7).

Personal self-esteem. To measure personal self-esteem, we employed a previously published and validated scale - the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1979). The following items were included: “I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others”, “I feel that I have a number of good qualities”, “All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure (R)”, “I am able to do things as well as other people”, “I feel that I do not have much to be proud of(R)”, “I take a positive attitude toward myself”, “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”, “I wish I could have more respect for myself (R), “I certainly feel useless at times (R)”, “At times, I think I am no good at all (R)”.

Collective self-esteem. The identity subscale of the collective self-esteem scale measures the degree to which people draw their identity from group memberships, or their identification with the group. Five items were used to make this assessment: “I often refer to myself as a member of the university community”, “I feel that I have much in common with most other people at UCB”, “Being a member of the university community is only a small part of who I am” (R), “I find that my values and the values of most university community members are often very different” (R), “Being a member of the university community has very little to do with how I feel about myself” (R).

Promoting behavior. Four items measured promoting behaviors: “I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help UCB be successful”, “I try to make innovative suggestions to improve UCB”, “I volunteer to do things for UCB that are not required of me as a student”, “I give advice to other students about how to deal with the administration and bureaucracy”. For each item, participants rated their agreement from agree (1) to disagree (4).

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0.75). Participants rated their opinion of each item on a scale ranging from “UCB is much worse” (1) to “UCB is much better” (7).

Limiting behavior. Four items measured limiting behavior: “I come to class on time”, “I follow the policies established by UCB”, “I sometimes miss deadlines set by the professor (R)”; “I sometimes miss deadlines set by the administration” (R). For each item, participants rated their agreement from agree (1) to disagree (4).

### Measures, Study 2

Autonomous pride. A six item scale was created: “I would feel good if I was described as a typical member of \_\_\_\_”, “I am proud to tell my friends that I belong to \_\_\_\_”, “I often talk about \_\_\_\_ as a great group”, “I feel strong ties to \_\_\_\_”, “I make excuses for being in \_\_\_\_” (R), “I would be proud to be identified as a member of \_\_\_\_”.

Comparative pride. A four item scale was created: “\_\_\_\_ functions very well compared to other coops”, “The reputation of \_\_\_\_ is much better than other coops”, “Members of \_\_\_\_ are very cooperative, compared to other coops”, and “The overall living conditions at \_\_\_\_ are good, compared to other coops”.

Autonomous respect. An eight item scale was created: “I believe I have a good reputation in \_\_\_\_”, “Other members of \_\_\_\_ react well to me”, “I have made a good impression on others in \_\_\_\_”, “Most members of \_\_\_\_ like me”, “Most members of \_\_\_\_ respect me”, “I often feel like a useless member of \_\_\_\_” (R), “Other members value my ideas”, and “Other members appreciate the work I do”.

Comparative respect. A three item scale was created: “The work I do at \_\_\_\_ is appreciated more than the work of other residents”, “My ideas get more attention than those of others”, and “Some residents look up to me more than to other residents”.

Personal self-esteem. A ten item scale was created: “I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others”, “I feel that I have a number of good qualities”, “I am inclined to feel that I am a failure” (R), “I feel I am able to do things as well as other people”, “I feel that I do not have much to be proud of” (R), “I am taking a positive attitude towards myself”, “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”, “I wish I could have more respect for myself” (R), “I certainly feel useless” (R), and “I think I am no good at all” (R).

Collective self-esteem. A four item scale was used, based on the identity subscale of collective self-esteem: “Being a member of \_\_\_\_ has very little to do with how I feel about myself” (R), “Being a member of \_\_\_\_ is not important to my sense of what kind of person I am”

(R), “Belonging to \_\_\_\_ is an important part of my self-esteem”, and “Belonging to \_\_\_\_ is an important reflection of who I am”.

Limiting behavior. A four item scale was created: “I sometimes miss an assigned work shift at \_\_\_\_”, “I sometimes miss mandatory house meetings and other functions at \_\_\_\_”, “People sometimes have to remind me to follow certain house rules at \_\_\_\_”, and “How often do you comply with the direct requests of the house officers?”.

Promoting behavior. A four item scale was created: “How often do you volunteer to do extra work?”, “How often do you make suggestions to improve \_\_\_\_”, “How often do you do more than your share of work to help \_\_\_\_”, and “How often do you contribute to \_\_\_\_ beyond your required duties?”.

Procedural justice. The items used were framed by asking about the procedures used in the cooperative to manage disagreements. Four items were used to assess procedural justice: "How fair are the methods that [your coop] uses to resolve conflicts", "Are the methods equally fair to all sides", "Do both sides get an equal chance to tell their side of the story", and "Are both sides assured that their side of the story will be taken into full consideration before a solution is made". These items were combined into a single index of procedural justice ( $\alpha = 0.93$ ).

### Measures, Study three

Responses to all the items below ranged from disagree (1) to agree (6).

Autonomous pride. A five item scale was used to assess autonomous pride, with items such as, “I feel proud to be a part of my work group“ and “I would recommend to a close friend that they work in my work group”.

Comparative pride. Comparative pride was measured using a three item scale: “My work group is one of the most desirable within \_\_\_\_”, “I work in one of the best work groups in \_\_\_\_”, “I cannot think of another group in which I would rather work”.

Autonomous respect. A six item scale was created to measure autonomous respect. Items consisted of responses to “Would you agree or disagree that your managers: 1) respect the work you do, 2) respect your work-related ideas, 3) value what you contribute at work, 4) approve of how you do your job, 5) appreciate your unique contributions on the job, 6) value you as a member of your work group”.

Comparative respect. Comparative respect was measured using the following three items: “Would you agree or disagree that your managers: 1) treat you better than they treat other employees, 2) respect you more than other employees, 3) value you more than most other employees”.

Procedural justice. Assessments of the procedural fairness of the work organization were made using a five-item scale: “How often do you feel that decisions are made in fair ways at your job?”, “Overall, how fair would you say decisions and processes are where you work?”, “How would you rate the overall fairness with which issues and decisions that come up at work are handled?”, “Is there a general sense amongst employees that things are handled in fair ways at work?”, “How much of an effort is made to be fair to employees when decisions are being made?”.

Distributive justice. Outcome fairness was measured using three items: “How fairly are resources (e.g. salary, bonuses, etc.) allocated amongst employees where you work?”, “Overall, how fair is the salary you receive at work?”, “Would you say that there is an emphasis where you work on distributing things fairly?”.

Outcome favorability. Evaluations of the extent to which organizational decisions are favorable to the respondent were measured using responses to five items: “How favorable are the resources and outcomes you receive at work?”, “Do the resources and outcomes where you work exceed your expectations?”, “Overall, how favorable are the outcomes you receive at work in each of the following areas: 1) your salary?, 2) your job responsibilities?, 3) your work load?”.

Promoting behaviors. In order to expand up on our conceptualization of promoting behaviors, two subscales were averaged to create an aggregate index of engagement in promoting behaviors. The first examined the effort respondents put in to the performance of their required work tasks (in-role behavior), and consisted of 11 items--such as "fulfilling the responsibilities in your job description" (alpha = 0.92). The second scale was composed of nine items focusing on non-required behaviors they performed in order to help their supervisors and their organization (extra role behavior)--such as "volunteering to do nonrequired work" (alpha = 0.84).

Limiting behaviors. The index of limiting behaviors was also composed of two subscales, one composed of three items assessing the respondent’s overt compliance with supervisors’ requests--for example, "doing as your supervisor requests" (alpha = .92) and the

other composed of nine items measuring the extent to which the respondent voluntarily deferred to rules at work--for example "willingly following company policies" ( $\alpha = 0.85$ ).

Identification. An eleven-item scale was used to measure the level of the respondent's identification with the work organization. The scale used items such as "My work is important to the way I think of myself as a person".

Intention to remain with the organization. A seven-item scale was used to assess the respondent's behavioral intention of remaining with their organization ( $\alpha = 0.94$ ). The scale used items such as "I intend to stay at my present job".

Table 1

Study 1--Means, standard deviations, scale intercorrelations and coefficient alphas

Scale	Mean (s.d.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Autonomous pride	3.14 (0.90)	.78							
2. Autonomous respect	2.92 (1.19)	.31	.84						
3. Comparative pride	6.10 (0.86)	.30	.13	.87					
4. Comparative respect	4.45 (1.00)	.18	.31	.13	.85				
5. Personal self-esteem	4.97 (0.73)	.26	.48	.15	.43	.74			
6. Collective self-esteem	4.12 (1.06)	.47	.23	.14	.13	.11	.68		
7. Limiting behavior	3.18 (0.62)	.20	.18	.11	.09	.15	.08	.68	
8. Promoting behavior	2.57 (0.63)	.25	.32	.11	.22	.26	.34	.09	.60

Note.  $n=380$ . Diagonal entries are the alphas for each scale.

Table 2

## Study 1--Factor analysis of the independent variables

Item	1	2	3	4
1. I cannot think of another University I would rather attend.	.69			
2. I often think about transferring.	-.71			
3. I will probably look for an alternative university in the next year	-.59			
4. I am proud to think of myself as a member of the UCB community.	.65			
5. When someone praises the accomplishments of a member of the UCB community I feel like it is a personal compliment to me.	.48			
6. I talk up UCB to my friends as a good place to go to school.	.70			
7. I feel good when people describe me as a typical UCB student	.64			
8. When someone asks what University I attend, I wish I did not have to tell them.	-.43			
9. How does the reputation of UCB compare to the reputation of other universities?			.82	
10. How does the work being done by people at UCB compare to the work being done at other universities?			.88	
11. How do the accomplishments of people at UCB compare with the accomplishments of those at other Universities?			.87	
12. How does the value of a UCB education compare to the value of an education at other universities? If they knew me well most members of the UCB community:			.77	
13. Would respect my values		.73		
14. Would think I have accomplished a great deal		.76		
15. Would approve of how I live my life.		.77		
16. I believe that most members of the UCB community respect me.		.73		
17. I believe that I make a good impression on others at UCB.		.78		
18. How do your accomplishments compare to to the average UCB student?				.81
19. How are you doing compared to the average student?				.89
20. To what extent are you better or worse off than the average UCB student?				.84
Eigenvalues	5.29	2.74	2.09	1.66
Percentage of variance	27%	14%	10%	8%

Note. Principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation. All loadings over 0.40 are included.

Table 3

Study 1--Regression analysis examining the effect of status judgments on self esteem and group behavior

	Personal self-esteem	Collective self-esteem	Limiting behavior	Promoting behavior
Autonomous				
Pride	.08	.44***	.15**	.15**
Respect	.35***	.08	.12*	.24***
Comparative				
Pride	.04	-.01	.05	.02
Respect	.30***	.03	.01	.12*
Total adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	32%	22%	5%	13%
Unique variance explained by:				
Autonomous judgments	13%	19%	4%	8%
Comparative judgments	8%	0%	0%	1%

Entries are beta weights for an equation in which all terms are entered at the same time.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 4  
 Study 2-- Means, standard deviations, scale intercorrelations, and coefficient alphas

Scale	Mean (s.d.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Autonomous pride	4.45 (1.34)	.88							
2. Autonomous respect	5.02 (1.08)	.47	.90						
3. Comparative pride	5.07 (1.18)	.50	.34	.79					
4. Comparative respect	3.34 (1.35)	.16	.23	-.04	.76				
5. Personal self-esteem	4.39 (0.65)	.14	.37	.15	.18	.84			
6. Collective self-esteem	3.61 (1.10)	.67	.42	.41	.11	.11	.85		
7. Limiting behavior	4.75 (0.75)	.15	.37	.17	.04	.18	.14	.65	
8. Promoting behavior	3.79 (1.25)	.33	.19	.05	.41	.11	.20	.27	.87

Note.  $n=193$ . Scales range from 1 to 7, with high numbers indicating positive endorsement of the construct. Diagonal entries are the alphas for each scale.

Table 5

Study 2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices

Model	$\chi^2$	df	AIC	CFI	NFI	Std. RMR	IFI
1. Four factor	251	158	65	.95	.95	.06	.96
2. Pride & respect	609	169	270	.78	.73	.10	.79
3. Autonomous & comparative	943	169	605	.62	.57	.15	.62

Table 6

Study 2--Regression analysis examining the effect of status judgments on self esteem and group behavior

	Personal self-esteem	Collective self-esteem	Limiting behavior	Promoting behavior
Autonomous				
Pride	-.09	.68***	-.05	.33***
Respect	.36***	.03	.38***	-.01
Comparative				
Pride	.07	-.01	.07	-.09
Respect	.12	.03	-.03	.36***
Total adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	14%***	47%***	12%***	23%***
Unique variance explained by:				
Autonomous judgments	9%	34%	10%	7%
Comparative judgments	1%	0%	1%	13%

Entries are beta weights for an equation in which all terms are entered at the same time.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 7

Study 3-- Means, standard deviations, scale intercorrelations and coefficient alphas

Scale	Mean (s.d.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Procedural justice	3.33 (1.17)	.95										
2. Distributive justice	2.88 (1.20)	.71	.83									
3. Outcome favorability	3.35 (0.99)	.62	.68	.83								
4. Autonomous pride	4.13 (1.26)	.58	.43	.49	.93							
5. Comparative pride	3.50 (1.29)	.43	.35	.40	.75	.87						
6. Autonomous respect	4.42 (1.16)	.56	.43	.49	.59	.48	.95					
7. Comparative respect	3.08 (1.10)	.32	.28	.32	.29	.24	.51	.92				
8. Promoting behaviors	5.03 (0.51)	.14	.05	.12	.25	.15	.25	.22	--			
9. Limiting behaviors	5.27 (0.47)	.21	.13	.15	.23	.11	.21	.06	.43	--		
10. Identification	4.01 (0.88)	.39	.33	.40	.56	.47	.40	.32	.48	.24	.89	
11. Intent to remain	3.65 (1.32)	.47	.47	.49	.51	.47	.41	.14	.22	.25	.48	.94

Note.  $n=540$ . Scales range from 1 to 6, with high numbers indicating positive endorsement of the construct. Diagonal entries are the alphas for each scale. No alpha is presented for the scales of promoting and limiting behaviors, since those measures are constructed of subscales (see appendix for subscales' description and alphas).

Table 8

Study 3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices

Model	$\chi^2$	df	AIC	CFI	NFI	Std. RMR	IFI
1. Four factor	453	113	228	.96	.94	.03	.96
2. Pride & respect	1528	118	1292	.82	.81	.10	.82
3. Autonomous & comparative	2834	118	2598	.66	.65	.25	.66

Table 9  
 Study 3—Regression Analysis Predicting Status Judgments

	Pride		Respect	
	Autonomous	Comparative	Autonomous	Comparative
	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$
Procedural justice	.47***	.31***	.44***	.16**
Distributive justice	-.09	-.02	-.05	.04
Outcome fav.	.27***	.22***	.26***	.16**
Total adj. R <sup>2</sup>	36%	21%	35%	9%
Unique variance of:				
Proc. Justice	12%	4%	9%	1%
Outcome fav.	3%	3%	3%	2%

Entries are beta weights for an equation in which all terms are entered at the same time.

\*p<.05. \*\*p<.01. \*\*\*p<.001.

Table 10

## Study 3—Regression Analysis Predicting Organizational Outcomes

	Promoting Behavior	Limiting Behavior	Identification	Intent to remain
Autonomous				
Pride	.20**	.26***	.47***	.36***
Respect	.13*	.16**	.04	.19***
Comparative				
Pride	-.09	-.16*	.03	.10
Respect	.10*	-.05	.15***	-.08
Total adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	8%	6%	33%	31%
Unique variance explained by:				
Autonomous judgments	4%	5%	9%	9%
Comparative judgments	1%	1%	2%	1%

Entries are beta weights for an equation in which all terms are entered at the same time.

\*p<.05. \*\*p<.01. \*\*\*p<.001.




Figure 1. The mediating role of status judgments