Weekly Seminar: Roman M. Sheremeta, “Why Are We So Competitive” (Thursday, October 12th, 2017)

Roman Sheremeta is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University and a research affiliate at the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Purdue University. The focus of his research is in experimental economics and game theory, with applications to behavioral economics, conflict resolution, industrial organization, public and labor economics.

The presentation will be loosely based on the paper “Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests.” https://ideas.repec.org/p/chu/wpaper/16-21.html

Weekly Seminar: Drew Fudenberg, “Predicting and Understanding Initial Play” (Thursday, October 5th, 2017)

Drew Fudenberg is the Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at MIT.  He received an A.B. in applied mathematics from Harvard College in 1978, and a Ph.D. in economics from MIT in 1981.  Fudenberg’s work on game theory ranges from foundational work on learning and equilibrium to the analysis of repeated games and reputation effects to the study of particular games, competition between firms, and other topics in theoretical industrial organization.  More recently he has worked on topics in behavioral economics and decision theory such as self-control and stochastic choice.

 

Weekly Seminar: Antonio Guarino, “Updating Ambiguous Beliefs in a Social Learning Experiment” (joint with Roberta De Filippis, Philippe Jehiel and Toru Kitagawa) (Thursday, April 27th, 2017)

Antonio Guarino is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at UCL.  He received his PhD in Economics from New York University.  His research interests cover financial economics (market microstructure), economic theory (social learning) and experimental economics.

Weekly Seminar: Muriel Niederle, “A Gender Agenda or From the Lab to the Field to Policy” (Thursday, April 20th, 2017)

Muriel Niederle is a Department of Economics Professor at Stanford University.  She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University.  She is a behavioral and experimental economist with a strong interest on gender differences in economic outcomes.  Niederle also has a line of work on market design.

Weekly Seminar: Collin Raymond, “Preferences for Non-Instrumental Information and Skewness” (Thursday, March 30th, 2017)

Collin Raymond’s research combines theory and experiments.  He primarily works on issues related to risk and information; especially how individuals seek out, and then use, certain types of information.  He earned his PhD from the University of Michigan in 2012.  He is currently an assistant professor at Amherst College, and will be starting as an assistant professor at Purdue in the autumn of 2017.

Spring 2017 Visiting Researcher: Peter Schwardmann

We would like to welcome Peter Schwardmann, who is visiting CESS from February to April 2017.  Peter’s research focuses on motivated cognition and topics in behavioral industrial organization.  He is particularly interested in why people hold biased beliefs and in how biased beliefs affect market outcomes.  Peter works at the University of Munich and received his Ph.D. from the Toulouse School of Economics in 2014.

Weekly Seminar: Theo Offerman, “Fight or Flight” (joint work with Boris van Leeuwen and Jeroen van de Ven) (December 15th, 2016)

theo-1 When two players compete for a prize, they sometimes try to act as quickly as possible.  At other times, they wait and see if the other person chooses to flee first.  We study this interaction in the context of a dynamic fight-or-flight game.  At each moment, a player can decide to wait, flee or fight.  Players are privately informed about their strengths, which in case of a battle determine who wins the prize.  In the case that one player flees and manages to escape, the other player earns the prize plus a “chase-away value”.  We show that the chase-away value determines if fights occur immediately or only after a waiting period.  In cases where the chase-away value is positive but not too large, players can use time to learn something about the type of the opponent, as the weaker players may find it advantageous to flee earlier in the game.  Weaker players thereby avoid the risk of ending up in a fight.  We derive conditions under which this is the case, and test this experimentally in the lab.  Our findings support the idea that endogenous timing can reduce the likelihood of a fight compared to a static version of the game (where players decide simultaneously whether to fight or flee).  We also observe many fights early on in the game, even if strong players would benefit from waiting.

Weekly Seminar: Emanuel Vespa, “Contingent Preferences and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory” (December 1st, 2016)

emanuelvespa
Emanuel Vespa is an experimental economist who studies behavior in economic environments using laboratory data. Most of his research is on dynamic games and on contingent thinking. Emanuel joined the faculty at the University of California Santa Barbara after earning his Ph.D. from New York University in 2012. He is currently visiting Stanford University for the academic year.